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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine and explore the level of risk that CAMI workers 
confront under their existing labour-management partnership arrangement. Risk is explored 
using two distinct categories, distributive and political. Distributive risk is expressed as 
tangibly substantive, reflecting the real terms and conditions of employment, and the changing 
social relations of production on the floor. The second type of risk is political and is concerned 
with the effects that labour-management partnerships have on the displacement of unions as 
legitimate agents of/for workers within the workplace. Data was collected using three methods; 
content analysis, cross-sectional survey and focus group interviews. The study revealed that 
CAMI workers are exposed to both distributive and political risk under their current LMP 
arrangement.   
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction  
 
1.0  Introduction 
 
CAMI Automotive was supposed to be different. Located in Ingersoll Ontario, it was co-
created in 1988 by General Motors (GM) and Suzuki Motor Company and was one of the first 
Canadian automotive assembly plants in Canada to practice lean production and Japanese 
production management (JPM)
1
. CAMI was also the first auto assembly plant in Canada to 
allow the unionization of its plant workers without a membership vote. Significantly, CAMI 
served as the site for Canada’s first voluntary joint labour-management partnership (LMP)2 
agreement in the auto industry. The LMP brought a promise of worker empowerment, 
improved labour relations and extended rights and benefits in exchange for worker commitment 
to intensified labour on the assembly-line floor.   
 The Canadian Auto Workers union collaborated with Suzuki and GM during the formative 
stages of CAMI, co-developing the organizational plant structures, processes, and practices 
aimed at achieving continuous improvement on the shop floor through the elimination of waste. 
In return for their commitment to the partnership and lean production, the CAMI LMP should 
have guaranteed workers equal access to the decision making process, providing them with a 
voice in determining how work is performed everyday on the assembly-line floor. However, it 
didn’t take long for the company to silence worker voices and any workplace harmony that 
existed prior to the production was short lived once CAMI began to build cars. 
                                                 
1
 For clarity purposes, JPM, LMP and lean production are synonymous and will be used throughout this 
article.  
2
 See Appendix G for a breakdown on LMP principles. Information table from Working in Partnership, by 
Sarah Pass, 2008: www.nottingham.ac.uk. 
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  By 1992, workers
3
 voted to strike against the company, mocking CAMI company “values 
of open communications, empowerment, kaizen
4
, and team spirit by replacing them with their 
own new values of dignity, respect, fairness, and solidarity” (Rinehart et al., 1997:4). Earlier 
research at CAMI has encompassed measuring worker commitment to lean manufacturing 
techniques, and that question has already been answered. Research has found that workers at 
CAMI are not as committed to lean manufacturing as they initially were when the Suzuki-led 
management team of 1990 opened the doors to the CAMI plant. With reduced levels of shop 
floor democracy and rising levels of exploitation of the labour-force, workers ultimately 
withdrew their support to many of the lean programs, and from the 1992 strike onward, they 
began reasserting their rights to resist through formal and informal means. And although past 
CAMI research findings suggest reduced worker commitment connected to certain technical 
aspects of lean manufacturing, the broader question of “worker risks” from partnership 
arrangements has not yet been asked at CAMI.   
In December of 2009, GM announced that it had bought out Suzuki Motors to become the 
sole owner of the company. At the time of its formation, CAMI was the third step of a three-
pronged initiative
5
  by GM to introduce JPM in North America. Today, the other two prongs of 
GM’s lean manufacturing and LMP strategy (NUMMI and Saturn Corporation) no longer exist.  
Given the failure of GM’s other two LMP initiatives, CAMI workers and the CAW are well 
advised to pay very close attention to their new owner.  
North American based research on the topic of LMPs suggests that labour usually suffers 
under these arrangements (Murray et al., 2000; Parker, 1987; Graham, 1989; Rinehart et al., 
                                                 
3
 This research is limited to studying the unionized workers at CAMI, represented by CAW Local 88.  
4
 Kaizen is also known in North America as either quality circles or quality of working life, Kaizen’s 
objective is to find efficiency through continuous improvement techniques and methods. 
5
 Information gathered from Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAMI_Automotive. 
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1997). However it seems, on the surface, that CAMI workers have managed to cope well under 
global pressures on the automotive industry. In fact, the CAMI plant has prospered under its 
LMP during very difficult economic times. With over 3000 unionized workers on site and 
continued growth expected, the LMP seems to have worked to the benefit of workers and the 
company alike. However, discussions with the union executive and workers reveal a more 
complex story. Workers are under constant pressure to perform at peak levels. The creation of a 
new “second-tier” labour force, called supplemental workforce employees (SWEs) and 
introduced in the 2010 bargaining round, appears both divisive and unfair. And of course, the 
misuse of JPM and the intensification of work are of paramount importance to workers on the 
line. Since the 2008 recession, GM continues to develop and initiate major cost reduction 
programs aimed squarely at its workforce. CAMI workers need to be prepared. Accordingly, 
the purpose of this study is to examine and explore the level of risk that CAMI workers 
confront under their existing labour-management partnership arrangement.   
Risk will be explored in relation to two distinct categories, distributive and political.  
According to Lucio and Stuart (2005), distributive risk can be conceptualized as tangibly 
substantive, reflecting the real terms and conditions of employment, and the changing balance 
of power on the floor. Moreover, distributive risk also encompasses the trade off of combined 
workplace flexibility and the intensification of workload, ostensibly in exchange for increased 
“job security”. Risk contrasts with the notion of reciprocal obligation, in which workers receive 
employment security in return for a high level of workplace intensity and commitment 
(Womack et al., 1990: 102), a characteristic of JPM considered vital for lean manufacturing to 
succeed but which has rarely been realized by workers outside of Japan. The second type of 
risk is political and associated with the effects that labour-management partnerships have on 
 10 
the displacement of unions as legitimate agents of/for workers within the workplace.  In other 
words, unions can find themselves undermined or even displaced within the dynamic of the 
workplace through formal and informal relations achieved through the use of team leaders, 
group leaders, team concept, kaizen programs and other collaborative-participative mechanisms 
normally associated with lean manufacturing partnership arrangements.   
 
1.1 Outline 
This research is structured into five chapters. Chapter Two begins with a general overview 
of past CAMI research followed by a brief discussion of the literature on similar North 
American and European LMPs. The chapter then provides a Marxian critique of LMPs and lean 
production per se.  Chapter Three sets out the methodology and research design. It concludes 
by discussing limitations to the research and a brief review of some ethical considerations.  
Chapter Four presents the results in relation to the two types of risk examined: distributive and 
political. The review presents findings related to contract review, grievance summary and the 
cross-sectional survey measured against prescribed LMP principles. It continues by providing 
an in-depth review of the experiences and implications of the SWE category. Chapter Five 
provides concluding remarks on the topic of risk to workers at CAMI.   
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review 
 
2.1  CAMI Background. 
CAMI has been the site of previous research projects related to worker commitment and 
JPM. Notably, Rinehart, Huxley, and Robertson researched CAMI Automotive from 1990 to 
1991. Their longitudinal study, published in 1997, measured the effects of lean production on 
worker commitment. Additionally, they focused on workplace alienation and the intensification 
of workload under lean manufacturing. My first paper, CAMI Automotive, Issues & Concerns 
Leading to the Strike (1992), focused on uncovering the primary reasons why CAMI workers 
chose to strike after only two years of working under the JPM model. My second paper, Lean 
Production in the Scarce Economy, Coping at CAMI (2008), focused on the erosion of worker 
commitment under JPM, and closely mirrored the work done by Rinehart et al.  In this section, 
I will briefly review the results of these specific research projects and their relevance to my 
current research. 
Rinehart et al. (1997) studied the effects of lean production on the workers of CAMI over 
two years, and found multiple reasons for the erosion of worker commitment at CAMI. On the 
shop floor, production requirements intensified as managers used worker suggestions (garnered 
using JPM methodology) and kaizen to increase workloads while at the same time reducing 
takt
6
 times. In other words, as workers improved the production process, management used the 
new-found efficiencies against the workforce.  As CAMI management broke its twin promises 
                                                 
6
 Takt time is an industrial engineering term which refers to the amount of time it takes to complete a 
predetermined task in any process.  One goal of lean production is to reduce takt time. 
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of following the tenets of lean production and reciprocal obligation
7
, workers became 
progressively disillusioned with and subjectively alienated from the JPM manufacturing 
process and the product of their own work.  As Rinehart et al. reported: 
The proportion of highly committed and moderately committed workers 
in the sample declined through each of the four interview periods. By the 
final round, 50.6 percent fell into the moderately committed category, 
while only 1.3 percent indicated high commitment. The percentage of 
uncommitted respondents grew steadily from 11.8 in round 1, to 24.7 in 
round 2, and to 48.1 in the final round. Despite a highly selective 
recruitment process, the ideals taught in Nagare
8
 training, and the 
company’s professed commitment to a labour-management partnership, 
workers’ disenchantment with CAMI grew steadily. The number of 
workers who indicated no commitment to CAMI’s objectives quadrupled 
over the two-year research period (1997:163). 
The CAMI strike of 1992 was significant for many reasons.  JPM is based on a collaborative 
model of labour relations that is ostensibly highly committed to a total teamwork approach and 
a worker-friendly environment. Focusing on team-work cells, multi-skilled workers, and a 
participative union-management decision-making process, CAMI was to be the new model of 
automotive manufacturing in Canada. Womack, Roos and Jones have described dynamic work 
teams as the “heart of the lean factory” (1990:99). According to Jurgens, Malsch and Dohse, “ 
group work could be a means to achieve many objectives at the same time: greater job 
flexibility among individuals (by practicing job rotation), enhanced responsibility of shop floor 
workers for cost and quality (by delegating quality control, equipment maintenance, and 
                                                 
7
 According to Womack et al; “plants trying to adopt lean production reveal that workers respond only 
when there exists some sense of reciprocal obligation, a sense that management actually values skilled 
workers, will make sacrifices to retain them, and is willing to delegate responsibility to the team. Merely 
changing the organization chart to show “team” and introducing quality circles to find ways to improve 
production processes are unlikely to make much difference”(1990:99). 
 
8
  The CAMI training manual defines Nagare as “one by one” “mixed lot” production. In simple terms, this 
is a JIT, small lot, short production batch system which requires quick die changes and inventory changes. 
This would be considered the most demanding and dynamic system for building cars and trucks. See page 
27, Rinehart et al (1997).  
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process control responsibilities to the group), and improved social relations in production 
(through less control and more mutual help and support between workers and 
supervisors)”(1993:375). And yet on Monday, September 14th, 1992, 2,100 workers of CAW 
Local 88 went on strike against CAMI, signaling to the automotive industry that something had 
gone drastically wrong.   
My 1992 study
9
 revealed some interesting facts about the strike and the effects that JPM was 
having on CAMI workers. Once CAMI commenced the production of cars, JPM ideology 
shifted. Founding putative principles and values receded under the constant change of shop 
floor supervisors and middle management personnel. As new managers arrived, workers 
noticed that those “values” meant less and less. Cost reduction and efficiency replaced the 
original values of open communication, empowerment, kaizen, and team spirit. In the end, 
workers overwhelmingly blamed the influx of GM management for the erosion of JPM 
values
10
. As the commitment to the “founding values” diminished, workers reacted in defiance 
to the change.  As one worker stated, “If they want to treat us like the others, then they are 
going to have to pay us like them
11” (Billyard, 1992:13). Striking for higher wages and 
improved shop floor rights can be viewed as the overtly antagonistic response of the workers to 
the loss of company commitment to JPM values and methodology.  
My interest in CAMI was revived in 2008 when I wrote my undergraduate thesis, Lean 
Production in the Scarce Economy, Coping at CAMI.  This time, I was interested in following 
up on the Rinehart et al. study on the commitment of workers to lean production. Their work 
                                                 
9
 This study included a cross-sectional survey and ‘strike line’ focus groups.  
10
 My 1992 finding contrasted Rinehart’s main finding. He discounted the influence of  GM middle 
management in eroding commitment to lean and the LMP.  
11
 Workers at CAMI were paid less than traditional automotive plants in Ontario at that time. This worker, 
and others, expressed strong feelings that CAMI workers were paid less while having to work harder 
(intensification of workload) under JPM.  
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directly connected worker disenchantment to JPM practice and CAMI management 
performance.  As such, my 2008 research closely mirrored that of the Rinehart team’s previous 
work. Duplicating many of their questions
12
 allowed me to draw comparisons to earlier 
research on worker commitment. Survey results indicated how workers continued to withdraw 
their support from kaizen initiatives aimed primarily at productivity improvement.  At the same 
time workers were ready to commit to lean production on the proviso that the original JPM 
methodology was adhered to. But before they would commit, they demanded increased job 
security as a quid pro quo. Ultimately, workers responded aggressively to the lack of reciprocal 
obligation on the part of the company, accusing the company of using JPM rhetoric as a fig leaf 
to conceal increasingly exploitative practices.  
In 2010, Local 88 agreed to the use of Supplemental Workforce Employees (SWE). This 
decision would turn out to be one that the union not only regretted but has since rigorously 
fought GM to overturn. The background to SWE use in GM dates back to its implementation at 
the Oshawa plant in 2006. At that time, the union agreed with the company that SWEs could be 
hired on a temporary flexible basis, for a maximum of 8 months and only during model 
launches. For any other purpose, the company would need to have mutual agreement with the 
local union. Unfortunately for the Oshawa union and its members, the company failed to live 
up to its commitment on the use of SWE.  
Since that time, the use of SWE has escalated at CAMI while the company refused to hire 
any full time workers. Commenting on the use of SWE prior to negotiations in 2012, CAW 
President Ken Lewenza expressed his concern by saying: "When we bargained the 
supplemental workforce, the way it was explained to the committee was that these folks would 
                                                 
12
 Some of the Rinehart questions were duplicated in an effort to find comparisons.  My chosen research 
method was cross-sectional, whereas Rinehart’s was longitudinal.  
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mainly be used during major launches. During major launches you always need extra people. 
"Since then, every single time, including volume increases at CAMI, the company has argued 
it's a short term blip. That's an issue we're going to have to deal with in negotiations." 
(http://business.financialpost.com/20 l2/08/04/atables/)  
 
2.2     LMPs and Lean Manufacturing in North America 
   
Given the promises that LMPs bring to unions and workers, it is easily understandable today 
why the CAW decided to cooperate with GM-Suzuki in the creation of the CAMI partnership 
arrangement. LMP arrangements are described by proponents as good for both companies and 
workers. The textbook description for partnership work "refers to the relationship between 
employers, employees and their representatives. It is about developing better employment 
relationships of all levels, helping to build trust in the workplace, sharing of information and 
working together to solve business problems" (Pass, 2008:3). But the good news wasn’t 
supposed to stop there. The Involvement and Partnership Association (IPA) and the British 
Trades Union Congress (TUC) have developed exclusive partnership principles as objectives 
for companies, worker associations and unions to follow. According to the TUC, workplaces 
were more likely to have better performance results, higher retention rates and higher salaries 
and profits when they supported and practiced by the LMP models (Pass, 2008:3). According to 
Pass, academic research has uncovered partnerships bring seven primary benefits to workers 
and union; improved information sharing, decreased uncertainty, higher levels of trust, 
increased opportunities to influence management, involvement in decision making, better 
worker relations and harmonization of terms and conditions of employment and lastly 
recognition of the legitimate role of unions (2008:7). Given these purported results, it seems 
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reasonable for unions and workers to support the formation of partnerships when approached 
by employers to do so. Unfortunately, in practice, LMP arrangements have not produced the 
results for workers as often reported or expected. This latter point is corroborated by a review 
of research on how other LMPs in North America have fared under these arrangements.  
Workers at New Motors Manufacturing Inc (NUMMI) and Subaru Isuzu Automotive (SIA) 
experienced adverse working conditions as a result of their LMPs.  Mike Parker (1987) found 
that lean production resembled a “management-by-stress system” one characterized by 
increasing productivity levels through peer pressure (within self-managed work teams) and 
management intimidation on the assembly line. Parker paid particular attention to the use of the 
“andon cords”,13 as did Rinehart and his group. Both studies found management misusing 
andon cord principles as a way of increasing line speeds. Parker describes how this was 
accomplished: 
In the management-by-stress system, “all green” signals inefficiency. 
Workers are not working as hard as they might. If the system is stressed-
by speeding up the line for example- the weakest points become evident 
and the yellow lights go on.  Once the problems have been corrected, the 
system can then be further stressed (perhaps by reducing the number of 
workers) and then rebalanced.  The ideal is for the system to run with all 
stations oscillating between green and yellow. Thus the system 
equilibrates or drives toward being evenly balanced as managers 
constantly readjust and rebalance to make production even more 
efficient. (1987:262). 
 
Both Parker and Rinehart uncovered how shop floor management modified andon cord use 
to intensify work on the assembly line. My 2008 research uncovered similar abuse of the andon 
cord system. At CAMI, the yellow andon cord had been eliminated, leaving only the red and 
                                                 
13
 The Andon cord is a device that allows workers to ask for help. Usually accompanied by a lighting 
system (green/yellow and red) indicating the level or degree of the production problem. A red light 
signifies a line shut down, yellow a potential problem and green, no problem.  
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green, CAMI management’s solution to keeping the line running at optimum efficiency.  As 
one worker stated when asked about line speeds and andon cord use, “at $16,600 dollars a 
minute for downtime on the line they don’t care, they just want the line running” (Billyard, 
2008: 95). 
Similar to NUMMI, SIA workers also reacted to the intensification of work.  Laurie Graham 
(1989) wrote at a time when North American industry looked to JPM as means to regaining its 
competitive advantage over global competitors. Graham’s research uncovered similar patterns 
of worker abuse through the manipulation of lean production methods. Workers responded 
aggressively against SIA by openly challenging management on the shop floor and threatening 
unionization. Through their collective action, the SIA workforce was able to make some 
moderate gains, but Graham (1989: 79) reported that their gains were short lived and ultimately 
the collective actions of workers produced substantially negative outcomes. 
Unlike CAMI, partnership agreements usually result from direct pressures exerted on unions 
by companies that are claiming economic hardship. Canada’s first example of an LMP 
arrangement was reviewed by Murray, Levesque and Vallee (2000). Under extreme pressures 
and the threat of closure in 1999, the unionized workers of General Motors, Boisbriand, 
Quebec, co-crafted a new labour agreement with the company, transitioning plant relations 
from the established traditional automotive assembly model to lean manufacturing. Fearing 
plant closure and the promise of a new model line, the majority of workers agreed with signing 
onto the new agreement. The Boisbriand workers were in fact the first in Canada to negotiate 
and agree to this new form of social relations within the auto sector. They were also the first 
CAW local union to voluntarily open up the contract prior to the expiry date. And although 
their new agreement was hailed within the automotive industry, the workers of GM Boisbriand 
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soon realized their new relationship was fraught with new risks. Team concept, worker 
participation and co-operation in lean production programs led to increased workloads, rising 
occupational injuries and heightened worker dissatisfaction.    
Similar to CAMI, the Boisbraind workers experienced an intensification of work through 
reduced takt time associated with the kaizen principle and JPM team approach.  As reported by 
Murray, Leveque, and Vallee: 
Teamwork at Boisbraind, as has often been the case elsewhere, did not 
translate into an empowerment of the workers or an enrichment of their 
jobs.  Such a transformation was perhaps difficult to countenance when 
the average work cycle for most workers remained between forty-five 
and fifty-five seconds.  Furthermore, the introduction of lean production 
principles greatly reduced worker autonomy.  Workers could no longer 
gain time on the line by  temporarily working faster or accumulating a 
reserve of extra parts in order to create some personal recovery  or down 
time”( 2000:237).   
 
The workers at the Boisbriand plant soon realized that their new social relations pact with GM 
did not work in their favour. The promise of worker empowerment and equality under JPM was 
never realized. Contrary to the promises made during negotiations, the new LMP brought with 
it a reduction in worker autonomy, intensified work, reduced compensation and a weakened 
union. In other words, the Boisbriand workers experienced an increase in both distributive and 
political risks through their LMP.   
In 1998, the National Union of Arvida Aluminum Workers represented Jonquiere, Quebec 
workers in signing a new partnership agreement with Alcan whose premise was increased 
investment in exchange for a no-strike provision in the union contract. In this way, the 
company aimed at securing operational stability and the steady flow of product to the world 
market while the workers gain apparent workplace security through a commitment of increased 
capital investment in new technologies aimed at improving bottom line performance in the 
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global economy. Losing the right to strike for the duration of the collective agreement is a 
standard condition in all contracts. However, the Alcan workers further agreed to increase the 
length of this new partnership agreement to an astounding 18-year term. Not surprisingly, the 
agreement was viewed as a “beacon for a new labour-management relations climate for some, a 
testament to weakened union power and an undermining of union values and objectives for 
others” (Murray et al., 2000:238). 
In 1991, Atlas Steel, a division of Rio Algom, entered into a similar partnership arrangement 
with its Tracy Quebec workers. That partnership was described as the first of the new social 
contracts in Quebec to provide a “minimal level of employment, final offer arbitration on 
monetary issues for the next agreement, and the creation of a joint union-management 
committee on organizational change, human resources development and quality 
initiatives”(Murray et al., 2000:239). The Tracy agreement generally reflects the basic tenets of 
JPM and other LMPs, but it did have one strikingly different component.  As with Boisbriand, 
the Tracy workers relinquished union power in exchange for new financial investments 
dedicated to the modernization of its plant and equipment. But in the case of Tracy, the Quebec 
government intervened and demanded that “the union and management at Atlas Steel must 
agree to forego the right to strike or lockout for a period of six years before the state would 
agree to make a financial commitment to the modernization of the plant” (Murray et al., 
2000:239).   
This sort of government intervention can only militate against workers’ interests. State-led 
finance for capitalist projects is a false promise to workers. Governments invest tax dollars into 
corporations by way of grants, subsidies, tax breaks and loans which companies then take 
advantage of to improve sinking profitability during recessionary times while workers are 
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forced to accept concessions on wages and benefits.  In other words, Atlas workers relinquished 
their power by agreeing to the elimination of their right to strike so that the company could 
benefit from state finance. In return for losing their right to strike, one might think that the 
labour contract would have guaranteed the right of the workers to some form of profit sharing 
for the entire six-year duration. But this was not the case. Instead, workers relinquished their 
bargaining power simply in exchange for state financing that was used exclusively to build 
balance sheet wealth for the employer. Their sacrifice translated into greater shareholder wealth 
and strengthened the company’s bottom line at labour’s expense. Thus, the Tracy partnership 
could be described as a transitional relationship
14
. According to Lucio and Stuart (2005), 
transitional partnerships are entered into by labour when workers and unions believe they need 
to work closely with management to achieve a specific outcome. This seems to have been the 
case in the Tracy partnership. Indeed, the Tracy partnership was a micro-corporatist 
arrangement that placed “enterprise loyalty” above union and worker interests (Murray et al., 
2000: 240).    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Coercive, transitional and nurturing represent the types of relationship between workers and management in 
partnerships. See, Lucio and Stuart in, Partnership and new industrial relations in a risk society: an age of shotgun 
weddings and marriages of convenience (2005).  Transitional relationships extol the advantage of focused 
collaboration at critical points when strategic alliance is required. 
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2.3    LMPs and Conflictive-Collaboration. Managing the Relationship  
Case studies have proven how labour is put at risk in LMP arrangements. With workers 
taking the brunt of LMP risk, organized labour should be questioning the true purpose and 
validity of these types of relationship. Monica Rolfsen's (2011) paper is a response to previous 
research that questioned the ongoing value and benefit of LMP arrangements for labour.  
Rolfsen studied two North American examples of LMPs and a case study of a Norwegian 
manufacturing company that supports her argument that partnerships work better for unions 
when the latter maintain and exercise their traditional bargaining powers. Rolfsen maintained 
that close cooperation between unions and companies need not be a controversial issue if the 
power balance between them remains relatively equal. In developing her argument Rolfsen 
cites the 1984 NUMMI partnership between the United Auto Workers (UAW), General Motors 
and Toyota Automotive. The NUMMI partnership was unique, as it invited the union 
leadership to join management in the development of shop floor policies and procedures.  
Consulting with the union on operational matters also involved the union participating in the 
selection of team leaders. The involvement of the union in management matters created many 
shop-floor problems and rank-and-file workers soon began to distrust team leaders and union 
officials. Split in its views and reacting to diverse concerns over the partnership, the union body 
broke into two caucuses: the Administration caucus and the People’s caucus. For its part, the 
Administration caucus was accused of being too ‘cozy’ with management while the People’s 
caucus was considered out of touch and lacking vision as to how to take advantage of their new 
“partnership”. It’s important to recognize the legitimate concerns of the People’s caucus.  
When union-officials become part of the decision-making process and partake in the creation of 
rules and regulations, workers rights are always diminished. Rolfsen suggests that when 
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“participation increases, so does the need for internal union democracy in order to maintain the 
partnership on a long term level” (2011: 595).  The People’s caucus recognized that the union 
was weakened by collaborating with the company under conditions where the threat of conflict 
has been removed. Consistent with Rolfsen’s thesis, collaboration, in the absence of any 
willingness to resort to conflict, served to delegitimize and weaken the NUMMI union, leading 
to its ultimate demise.  
Unfortunately for NUMMI workers, on April 1
st
, 2010, 4,700 UAW members lost their jobs 
as car production was moved north to Toyota’s Cambridge, Ontario plant. Toyota cited the loss 
of GM as a partner in 2009 and the deep global recession of 2008-09 as the primary reasons for 
the closure. Interestingly, there was no mention of the LMP with the UAW in the 
announcement or subsequent press releases. The NUMMI partnership ultimately failed the 
union and its member/workers as their agreement did little to save their jobs in the end. The 
partnership with the union died when Toyota halted production. Today, Tesla Motors
15
 has 
reopened the plant to build electric cars after garnering a 365 million dollar federal loan.   
There was no mention anywhere in the press release of a labour partnership with the UAW.   
In carrying out her own study, Rolfsen visited Tool Factory, a small manufacturer of tools in 
Norway. Rolfsen claimed that the problematic aspect of LMP lies in the modified role that 
workers perform under the new arrangement. By acting as managers and taking on managerial 
responsibilities, team leaders and union executives who participate in the creation of company 
policy and practice begin to distance themselves from the rank and file. As previously 
discussed, this phenomenon was found to exist at NUMMI, leading to the formation of two 
competing caucuses.   
                                                 
15
 See the announcement at teslamotors.com, press releases. October 27
th
, 2010. 
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Rolfsen identifies two very important elements needed for successful long-term 
partnerships. The first speaks to distributive risks: workers should protect their wages and 
benefits at all cost, and not trade away compensation for new partnership agreements.  Second, 
extended partnership arrangements must be supported by extended union democracy.  In other 
words, unions must strategically focus worker power by negotiating strong contract language 
that builds workers’ rights into new partnership arrangements. They must also not cross over 
the fine boundaries that exist between management and workers. Becoming too involved in 
organizational decision-making weakens the union’s formal position as independent 
agents/protectors of the worker. When unions participate in organizational directives and the 
decision-making process (hiring, firing, evaluating, etc.), a management agenda is allowed to 
creep into the union ranks, further blurring institutional lines and effectively obviating the role 
of the union. Baccaro and Howell described this as institutional convergence. It reflects a 
“mutation in the function and meaning of existing institutions, producing different practices 
and consequences in new contexts” (2011: 525).  
Rolfsen does not view the blurring of roles within the organization as necessarily 
problematic. In fact, she insists that “close cooperation in long-term development issues need 
not be controversial. Quite the contrary, this is mentioned as the most positive outcome of the 
partnership” (Rolfsen, 2011: 591). Yet in the NUMMI example, Rolfsen found labour giving 
up too much power. It seems that Rolfsen is prescribing a precarious balancing act for workers 
if partnership arrangements are to work to their benefit or perhaps, more realistically, survive 
them.  In other words, workers can preserve partnership arrangements if they can learn to 
properly calibrate levels of collaboration and conflict with employers. In this respect, Rolfsen 
seems to be suggesting that workers should “cozy up” to management, but not get too close. In 
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summary, Rolfsen writes that “an important conclusion is that the long term development of 
organizational issues is an arena where the union can participate very closely without crossing 
the firing line” (Rolfsen, 2011: 606).   
   
2.4    The Truth about Lean Manufacturing: A Marxian Critique 
Rolfsen insists that unions can make LMPs work for them if they undertake certain 
protective strategies.  Others take the view that no LMP can actually benefit workers, no matter 
how effectively navigated by the union. Tony Smith (2000) applied the theoretical framework 
of Karl Marx in his book, Technology and Capital in the Age of Lean Production: A Marxian 
Critique of the New Economy.  In Smith’s words, “the project was to assess the extent to which 
Marxian theory illuminates contemporary developments in capitalism, in specific, the rise of 
‘flexible’ networks of production”16. In reviewing his work, I will concentrate my discussion 
on three critical Marxian concepts used by Smith; structural coercion, exploitation and real 
subsumption. Smith illustrates how these concepts refer to necessary and perennial features of 
capitalism in all its variant forms, including lean manufacturing and, by extension, LMPs.   
Referring to Volume 1 of Karl Marx’s Capital, Smith argues that structural coercion rests 
upon the basic inequality that exists under capitalism, with one class possessing sufficient 
economic resources to purchase the means of production and means of subsistence, while 
another class lacks such resources (Smith, 2000: 53). Smith argues that the inherent lack of 
equality between owners and workers under all forms of capitalism is paramount in 
determining the level or degree of structural coercion that exists within any given relationship.  
While the level or degree of structural coercion that exists within any owner-worker 
relationship is contingent upon the specifics of that arrangement, Smith concludes that workers 
                                                 
16
  An excerpt from Tony Smiths webpage, http://www.public.iastate.edu/~tonys/.  
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cannot escape the effects of structural coercion under any form of capitalism, including the 
novel forms related to LMPs and lean manufacturing.   
According to Smith, some advocates of the new economy argue for the importance of 
“multiple job experiences” and see this as a positive outcome for workers. Supposedly, workers 
benefit when they are forced to navigate through multiple career identities and a subsequent 
variety of workplace opportunities in a given lifetime of paid labour. In other words, the 
suggestion is made that workers are better off without labour employment guarantees. This 
neo-liberal perspective rationalizes the removal of “guaranteed work” in LMP arrangements 
under which corporations were to provide lifetime guaranteed employment to workers in 
exchange for workplace flexibility and intensified work under lean manufacturing. The creation 
of a counter-narrative to rationalize the disappearance of a fundamental tenet of LMP has been 
offered up as ideological compensation for job security and the reciprocal obligation long 
associated with lean manufacturing and established LMPs. Smith concludes that the “rhetoric 
of freedom here masks the continued coercive powers of capital” (2000: 55).   
Of course, most workers under LMP arrangements continue to be subjected to intensified 
work without any form of guaranteed employment making the LMP power arrangement fully 
biased in favour of capital. Workers involved in LMP arrangements are required to perform 
leaned out work at intensified rates without any added protection, or any reasonable form of 
reciprocal obligation from capital. In my focus group research, many of the workers 
interviewed talked about how they feared supervisor reprisal and termination if they failed to 
perform to the established productivity levels. Although CAMI workers were once optimistic 
about their relationship with CAMI, when it comes to trust and security, conditions have 
deteriorated considerably. As a full time worker observed, the “relationship with management 
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hasn’t changed. It was rough back then, and 23 years later, nothing has changed. We are 
penalized for not being able to keep up with lean production”. In this respect, CAMI workers 
continue to face the pressure of performance against an alternative measure of progressive 
discipline and termination. Thus, LMP arrangements have not resulted in any “balancing” of 
power between management and workers.    
The guarantee of lifetime work under lean manufacturing has already been debunked by 
many researchers (Parker, 1987; Rinehart et al., 1997; Graham, 1989; Murray et al., 2000).  
Today, lifetime work is only afforded to a small percentage of workers around the world in the 
automotive industry. Even in Japan, where life time work was once a hallmark of the auto 
industry, less than one third of the workforce now enjoys that distinct privilege (Smith, 2000: 
56). And even under those most favourable of arrangements, the company still has the right to 
terminate workers at its discretion. In North America, I was unable to find any evidence of a 
practicing LMP arrangement involving guaranteed work. However, LMP and lean production 
methodology persists in many different forms throughout North America, including CAMI 
Automotive, without any formal guarantees of work.  
Corporations will continue to push for the competitive advantage that lean production 
provides. But as more and more companies searching for higher profits embrace LMP 
principles and practices, their individual competitive advantage will disappear as the playing 
field levels out. Smith suggests this is one reason why workers are not provided guaranteed 
work in LMPs. Indeed, the right to fire is “extremely important to those who own and control 
capital.” As regarding terminating workers, Smith concludes that right to fire is “extremely 
important to those who own and control capital. Again and again they have refused to allow 
employment guarantees to be written into contracts on the grounds that this would limit their 
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flexibility. Needless to say, workers lack a symmetrical ability to depose of management” 
(Smith, 2000:57). In short, LMPs have not resulted in a balancing of the power relation 
between workers and management. Smith finds LMP workers also experience the same lack of 
power in their everyday work relations as do workers in other, more traditional forms of 
manufacturing. In this respect, structural coercion persists, albeit under a different set of 
institutional relations.  
Wage workers are exploited when their surplus value is appropriated by the capitalist in the 
form of profit. As Smith explains, “those who own and control capital are generally able to 
impose a wage contract whose terms allow them to appropriate an economic surplus created by 
wage labourers” (Smith, 2000:53). Surplus value is defined by Smith as the portion of value 
that workers create that is not distributed back to them. Exploitation enters the equation when 
surplus value is appropriated from workers by the company and retained for accumulation or 
capitalist consumption in the form of profit or earnings. But the notion of exploitation takes on 
a more sinister twist under lean manufacturing. When workers enter into LMP arrangements, 
they must perform to a set of operating principles and practices that demands far more of them 
than traditional manufacturing or automotive assembly. As Smith states, “the whole point of 
lean production is to produce more with less, that is, to increase economic output per unit of 
labour power purchased” (2000: 60). With increasingly frequent and prolonged recessions, the 
continued erosion of profits
17
 has forced companies to find new labour-saving technologies and 
methodologies to combat the structural limitations inherent in capitalism. Companies found that 
                                                 
17
 Murray E.G. Smith (2010:54) provides an in-depth analysis of Marx’s account of  the falling rate of 
profit.    
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lean production worked best to generate “relative surplus value”18 when scientific management 
techniques were combined with technological innovation and the diminished use of labour.  
Murray E.G. Smith (2010) has described why increasing “relative” as distinct from “absolute” 
surplus value has long been important to the profitability of capitalist enterprises: 
Since work time cannot be indefinitely extended, absolute surplus value 
faces a clear limit in the length of the working day and in the maximal 
intensity of the labour process.  Relative surplus value, on the other hand, 
faces limits set only by the level of development of labour-saving 
technology. Consequently, relative surplus value techniques become an 
increasingly important method of raising the rate of surplus value over 
the course of capitalist development – especially in the face of struggles 
by working people for a reduced workweek with no loss in pay 
(2010:53).  
 
However under the conditions of the current economic crisis, which has its roots in a 
profitability crisis of “productive capital” that extends back to the 1970’s, the automotive 
industry now faces structural limitations in raising the level of relative surplus value. In other 
words, “labour-saving” technological innovation is no longer able to provide solutions 
compatible with increasing the absolute magnitude of surplus value for automakers. With 
advances in labour-saving technology stalled due to the downward pressure they place on 
enterprise profitability companies have moved towards lean methodology to provide higher 
levels of productivity within the prevailing limits of the work-day. Indeed, JIT, JPM, MRP, 
lean manufacturing, quality circles, and kaizen qualify as capitalist innovations that are clearly 
geared towards producing larger quantities of absolute surplus value
19
. Such a strategy clearly 
exists within the LMP framework at CAMI, where there is clear evidence of reduced team 
                                                 
18
 “Precisely because relative surplus value techniques allow individual capitalist firms to produce more 
output with less labour, productivity improvements are sought through increases in the technical 
composition of capital” (Smith, M., 2010:53).   
19
 In Marx’s theory, such an intensification of the labour process serves to increase “absolute surplus 
value.” (Smith, M., 2010) 
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sizes, intensified work, and the shrinking of takt time or production cycles within the set limits 
of the “management imposed” six-day work-week20. 
Smith(2000) reports that workers in traditional assembly lines work forty-five seconds of 
every minute whereas in lean organizations they work fifty-seven seconds out of every minute 
on the line. The extra work time on the line “is equivalent to each worker performing the 
equivalent of more than an extra day’s labour every five-day week” (2000:60).  CAMI workers 
have reported (see Appendix C) that they are now working at the lean rate described by Smith.  
One worker reported that the assembly line cycles at 57 seconds, leaving no rest time between 
essential tasks.    
So, it’s proven that LMP workers produce more, work longer hours, and receive no 
additional income for their extra effort. From this perspective, they are clearly subjected to 
higher rates of exploitation. According to Smith, the key to exploitation lies in ownership, 
decision-making and control. In capitalist-owned organizations, the owners and management 
control how surplus value is accumulated and distributed, not the workers. For Smith, socialism 
is the only real alternative to the exploitation inherent in all “models” of capitalism. In this 
regard, he avers that “if the surplus is controlled by the workforce or its elected representatives, 
exploitation is not present. If it is not so controlled, then the category is applicable” (Smith, 
2000:62).   
Lastly, I will discuss the concept of real subsumption in relation to lean manufacturing.  
Real subsumption
21
 has been defined as a process whereby the class-antagonistic social 
relations of capitalism penetrate the labour process itself. Smith points to the development of 
                                                 
20
 Although the regular work week consists of  forty hours over five days, the company  has  the right to 
force workers to work up to forty-eight hours in any week, including Saturday, as per the collective 
agreement (under Article 33, Hours of Work).  CAMI continues to exercise its management rights under 
Article 33 and as such, Saturday work is mandatory.  
21
 Definition from; http://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/s/u.htm. 
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lean manufacturing and LMP arrangements as meeting the criteria of real subsumption.  As 
manufacturing firms faced the real threat of eroding profits, transforming the social relations in 
production
22
 became a necessary action as they fought for their financial survival. LMP 
advocates characterize the invention of lean manufacturing as a “worker friendly” collaborative 
form of labour-relations whereby workers are allowed to participate with management in 
organizing the labour process through continuous improvement programs and JPM. Smith calls 
this the “Good Taylorism” argument. He goes on to say, “the rhetoric of teamwork, multi-
skilling, and worker empowerment might seem to suggest that in the new economy the 
members of the workforce decide for themselves how production should be structured from day 
to day. This is not at all the case” (Smith, 2000:68). Smith argues that lean manufacturing 
continues to demonstrate the same fundamental antagonisms and alienating characteristics that 
have always existed between labour and capital. Lean represents a transformative stage of 
capitalist manufacturing solely developed by companies to augment absolute and relative 
surplus value. From this perspective, Smith concludes that lean is “captured by Marx’s 
definition of the real subsumption of labour under capital” (Smith, 2000:73).  
Research will show how CAMI workers have withdrawn from many of the imposed lean 
programs for many of the reasons that Tony Smith indicates in his book.  My research revealed 
how CAMI workers translated teamwork to really mean fewer workers under ever-intensified 
conditions. They understand multi-skilling to mean multi-tasking. And they also realize 
workers are not empowered at any level in the production process. In short, workers are 
powerless to make any changes at CAMI unless they opt to exert pressure on the company 
                                                 
22
 Michael Buroway defined the social relations in production as the relational aspect of the labour process that exists 
within a specific manufacturing setting and between workers and management (1979:15). Firms can alter the social 
relations in production through the introduction of new technology and shop floor transformative methodologies like 
JPM, JIT and LMPs. 
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through their collective bargaining power and ultimately the withdrawal of their labour if need 
be.   
To summarize, by applying the notions of structural coercion, exploitation and real 
subsumption, Smith concluded that LMPs, JPM, and lean production contain the same inherent 
characteristics as earlier capitalist forms. In many ways, Smith was also challenging new 
capitalist utopians. New-age labour-management relations have not reduced capitalist 
requirements for commodifying and exploiting living labour. Indeed, Smith found no evidence 
that the fundamental antagonism between labour and capital has changed under these new 
arrangements. Confident in his work, Smith stated “the baseline condition of the working class 
as a whole in lean production continues to be defined by a lack of access to the means of 
production and means of subsistence” (Smith, 2000:118).  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The chapter begins with a general discussion on the development of LMPs, JPM and lean 
manufacturing. The case studies provided in the literature review have revealed how previous 
research has shown how workers are at continuous risk from LMP arrangements. The inclusion 
of Rolfsen's research contrasted with other contributors and provided the reader with a 
conventional labour-relations view on LMPs. In her argument, Rolfsen provided remedies to 
unions that have entered into LMPs as combined solutions for surviving in LMPs relations while 
reducing overall worker risk. Rolfsen's research suggests that unions need to develop new coping 
strategies and additional protections (against both types of risk) when they participate in LMP 
relationships. However, by offering up band-aid solutions and remedies for workers as means of 
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reducing risk in these arrangements, Rolfsen’s recommendations actually imply there must be 
something fundamentally wrong with the LMP model.   
The chapter concludes by providing a Marxian analysis of lean production and LMPs. Tony 
Smith's research neatly contextualized the case study examples provided in the chapter by 
illustrating how LMPs contain the same inherent capitalist characteristics of earlier epochs. 
LMPs cannot be reformed as suggested by Rolfsen to improve working conditions (from the 
standpoint of workers) without undermining their very reason for existence for the capitalist 
employer. More precisely and on theoretical grounds, there are compelling reasons to believe 
that the whole purpose of LMPs is to weaken workers’ power to resist exploitation leading to 
increased “worker risk”. Indeed, Smith found no evidence that the fundamental antagonism 
between labour and capital has changed under these new arrangements to benefit labour.   
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
3.1  Introduction 
Because of the recent inclusion of SWE into the LMP arrangement, the research was split 
into two critical components for reviewing risk, FT and SWE. In this chapter, I will examine 
conceptualization, choice of research method, operationalization, survey population, and 
sampling.      
   
3.2.0 Research Design 
The purpose of my research is to reveal and understand the risks to unionized CAMI 
workers under the existing LMP agreement. This project has incorporated the three main 
aspects of social research: exploration, description and explanation.
23
 
The population being studied in this project is restricted to the hourly workforce of CAMI 
Automotive of Ingersoll, Ontario.  The workers are represented by CAW Local 88. The plant is 
located alongside Highway 401, one of Ontario’s main transportation corridors into the United 
States. The workforce of approximately 3000 is primarily drawn from southwestern Ontario 
and it also includes preferential hires
24
 from other GM plants. There are 570 acres (2.3 km
2
) of 
property with over 1.7 million sq. ft. of floor space. 
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 Most research studies include all three types. See in Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (1992:90-
92). 
24
 Preferential hires are displaced fulltime workers from other CAW-member plants in Ontario, namely 
EMD, in London.  In 2012, CAW bargained with GM to allow these workers to join the CAMI workforce 
after they had been displaced by the closure of their plant by EMD’s parent company, Caterpillar, in 
February 2012.  Unlike SWE workers, preferential hires retain fulltime worker rights and protection as 
afforded by the collective agreement.  SWEs now have fewer rights than workers that have never worked at 
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3.2.1 Cross-sectional Survey & Focus Group Interviews 
 The sample for the cross-sectional survey
25
 was drawn utilizing the snowball sampling 
method. However, this was not the original plan for determining the sample population. I 
initially requested union support for the use of a systematic random sampling methodology.  
Unfortunately, the union was unable to supply resources or grant time to accommodate my 
request. Without union support and access to the seniority roll and confidential worker 
information, I was not able to carry out this type of sampling procedure.  However, the union 
was prepared to distribute surveys selectively and proportionally throughout the plant by 
utilizing union area representatives. Each area in the plant received a proportion of blank 
surveys. The area representative was responsible for distributing surveys to those workers 
interested in participating.   
 The study population consisted of approximately 3000 unionized workers. Units of analysis 
were the individual workers within the ranks of the union, and only those actively working.  
With cooperation from the union executive and a shop floor committee, workers were 
approached to voluntarily participate in the cross-sectional survey. Each representative area 
received an appropriate number of blank surveys to be handed out to workers over a two-week 
period. In total, 300 surveys were introduced and distributed throughout the plant, or 
approximately 10.0% of the total worker population. With 280 completed surveys returned, I was 
                                                                                                                                                 
CAMI but were full-time CAW members elsewhere. About 475 CAW workers were terminated after 
rejecting a 50% reduction in wages to keep the plant open.  The union negotiated with GM to bring in these 
workers, considered legacy CAW workers.  Information from London Free Press, 
http://www.lfpress.com/2012/12/07/emd-in-temp-workers-out-at-cami-automotive 
 
25
 Designed to study some phenomenon by taking a cross section of it at one time and analyzing the cross 
section carefully (Babbie, 1991: 99).   
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able to secure a return rate of 93%, which overall can be viewed as a representative 9.3% of the 
total worker population at CAMI.   
It is worthwhile to briefly discuss how such a high rate of return for the survey was achieved. 
The researcher has established a long history with Local 88 dating back to 1992. Of particular 
importance, the union executive has maintained positive relations and continuity with the 
researcher, with the Plant Chairperson actively involved in previous research. Early discussions 
around the survey focused on concerns related to the 2008 survey return rate. Through that 
discussion, it was agreed by the union that they would more actively encourage their members to 
consider participating. This was achieved through their website, which spread the word of the 
project. As such, when worker representatives entered their areas with hard copy surveys, 
workers were already informed in advance about the research, making the job of handing out 
surveys much easier to accomplish.  
Workers received hard copies of the cross-sectional survey which included a cover page 
providing all necessary information required by the worker to allow for a value-making decision 
on his/her participation. The area representative was allowed to approach workers in their 
respective areas of work. The selection process for survey participants was solely determined by 
the area representative. Factors discussed where availability of active workers/participants and of 
course, interest in completing the questionnaire. Once completed, surveys were returned to the 
plant union office by the participant where a drop box was conveniently located. The union 
notified the researcher once it was determined that no further surveys were expected.  
 Focus group interviews were held at the CAW Local 88 union hall. Its uses were limited to 
providing thick descriptive examples to compare or contrast against survey findings and other 
secondary analysis only (Billyard, 2008:44). As union resources were limited, I was unable to 
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randomly select participants for focus group interviews. Due to these logistical constraints, I 
decided to tap into the union training schedule that was underway. Working with the union 
executive, I coordinated my focus groups around their existing training schedules.  Although this 
simplified the process of selection, focus group interviews were restricted to those who were 
receiving union training on the day of the interviews and closely align with nonprobability 
sampling method. Additionally, I separated workers into two categories, SWE and FT.  
Separating SWE from FT workers allowed SWE participants to openly discuss the contentious 
two-tier wage structure with the interviewer and other like-minded workers without fear of FT 
intimidation or reprisal. 
3.2.2 Survey Questionnaire Detail 
The survey (see Appendix A) was divided into three sections for purposes of analysis.  The first 
section of questions (1-6) are categorical variables providing generalized participant background 
information from the research population. Questions 7 through 20 (closed-ended) were intended 
to operationalize the concept of risk, both distributive and political. Additionally, these questions 
were framed to determine how the CAMI LMP stands up against the established principles of 
LMPs as developed by either the Involvement and Partnership Association (IPA) or the Trades 
Union Congress (TUC).
26
 The final two questions, 21 and 22 (open-ended), allowed participants 
to provide comment on specific plant floor concerns and to offer suggestions for improving 
worker rights.  Comments from questions 21 and 22 can be found in Appendix C. 
 
                                                 
26
 These are organizations located in the U.K. The Involvement and Partnership Association (IPA) was 
established through employer’s associations while the Trades Union Congress (TUC) was created from the 
representatives of organized labour.  Both groups developed similar values and principles related to labour 
and management partnership arrangements. See Samuel & Bacon (2010). 
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3.2.2a Research Population (Questions 1-6)   
(i)  Sex 
 
Of those that responded to the survey, 196 or 70% indicated that they were male with 84 or 
30% indicating they were female. The union reports that females account for approximately 
25% of the total worker population. Thus, the sample distribution closely resembles the 
gender mix of the overall worker population.   
(ii)  Age  
 
The CAMI workforce continues to age. With 232 out of 280 participants over 40 years of age 
and 48 or 17.2% aged 39 or lower, they are an aging workforce. According to the union, the 
average age of CAMI workers is 48 years.   
 
 
 
 38 
(iii) Years at CAMI 
 
Of the 280 respondents, 204 or 72.9% have more than 11 years with CAMI. The remaining 
76 or 27.1% have less than 10 years. High seniority and years of service reflects the low 
turnover rate of workers in the plant.   
 
(iv) Area worked at CAMI and Classification 
   
Assembly work is the predominant classification in the plant. The union estimates that 75% of all 
workers are in the assembly areas of the plant. Given their estimate, this result suggests that 
assembly is underrepresented in the survey. However, 73% of respondents had over 11 years 
service, suggesting that a higher proportion of senior workers (with the ability of working 
‘offline’) completed the questionnaire. This may explain why assembly is underrepresented.   
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(v)  Union Experience outside of CAMI 
 
Having past union experience in traditional workplace settings could influence how workers 
respond to terms and conditions within the LMP at CAMI. Working at CAMI under lean 
manufacturing exposes workers to intensified work, multi-tasking, and reduced cycle times.  
How workers view LMP could be influenced by their past experiences in either union or non-
union environments.  Of the respondents, 51.4% had previous union experience while 48.6 % did 
not belong to unions prior to joining CAMI.  
 
(vi) Job Class  
 
The role of the team leader is vital to managing lean manufacturing systems.  Additionally, in the 
CAMI setting, the team leader becomes the active conduit between management and worker.  
From the union perspective, the role of the team leader is also important to protect the rights and 
security of its workers. At the same time, management can influence team leaders to support 
company agendas which promote improved productivity and cost cutting initiatives. In this way, 
team leaders are constantly under pressure from workers and management. Understanding how 
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team leaders are assessing and responding to worker risk is therefore important. Of the 280 
respondents, 75 were team leaders with 205 making up production associates and production 
support group workers. With 205 respondents representing all other workers, the response mix 
between team leader and worker is appropriate to the demographics of the plant.    
 
(vii) Union Status 
 
Of the 280 respondents, 16 or 5.7% were union committeepersons, 3 or 1.1% represented the 
executive, with the remaining 261 or 93.2% comprising FT and SWE workers.   
 
(viii) Employment status 
 
Of all respondents, 88.9% were FT with 31 or 11.1% SWE workers. Having SWE workers 
respond is important given their reduced levels of compensation and workplace rights at CAMI. 
The ratio between SWE and FT workers in the survey is representative of the worker population 
in the plant.  
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3.2.2b LMP Values and Outcomes 
Nine questions (7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, and 19) are related to LMP values and outcomes 
as defined by the IPA and the TUC. These questions were intended to determine how CAMI 
workers might view LMP principles at work within their own environment. It’s important to note 
that these questions did not specify any of the LMP principles per se, but instead they reflect 
aspects of IPA and TUC values and outcomes. LMP values and outcomes are important criteria 
in assessing overall risk to workers. A company’s willingness to practice the prescribed values 
and outcomes can influence the level of risk that LMPs place on workers. In other words, 
adherence to LMP principles is vitally important to the partnership arrangement and required to 
limit risk to workers. These questions will measure how workers perceive management’s 
commitment to the LMP values and outcomes.  
 
3.2.2c Distributive & Political Risk   
Ten questions (10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 20) are related to the two types of risk 
that are associated with LMP partnership arrangements. These questions were intended to 
determine how workers perceived risk within their workplace. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
distributive risk can be expressed as tangibly substantive, reflecting the real terms and 
conditions of employment, and the changing social relations in production on the floor.  
Moreover, distributive risk is also concerned with the trade-off of combined workplace 
flexibility and the intensification of workload in exchange for increased worker security. The 
second type of risk is political and associated with the effects that labour-management 
partnerships have on the displacement of unions as legitimate agents of/for workers within the 
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workplace and more generally, the capacity of workers to organize collectively in opposition to 
management. 
 
3.3 Contract and Grievance Analysis and Review 
To further explore both distributive and political risks, the union provided collective 
agreements dating from September 21
st
, 1998 through to September 16
th
, 2013
27
. Contract 
analysis included a full review of base wages, shift premiums, vacation entitlement, and rest 
periods
28
. Additionally, the union was able to provide detailed grievance information dating 
from 2009 through to June 2012. Grievances were categorized by sex and type. For the purposes 
of this study, grievances were defined as either disciplinary or procedural. Sex was defined as 
either male or female. Disciplinary grievances were those initiated by workers to challenge 
disciplinary action against them, while procedural grievances related to compensation 
complaints, time studies, workloads, health and safety and other contract language or 
interpretation disputes.   
 
3.4  Limitations of the Research   
 There are some limiting factors associated with cross-sectional studies which must be 
addressed.  Internal validity is considered typically weak as it is difficult to establish causal 
relationships from the resulting data. Bryman and Teevan conclude: 
A cross-sectional design entails the collection of data (usually 
quantitative) on more than one case (usually many more than one) and at 
                                                 
27
 The first three contracts (89-91, 92-95, 95-98) were not available for review and are not included in this 
study.  CAW Local 88 has negotiated eight contracts to date. 
28
 See Appendix F for results. 
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a single point in time, on two or more variables (usually more than two), 
which are then examined to detect patterns of association. The practice 
makes it difficult to show cause because the independent and dependent 
variables are measured simultaneously, making any demonstration of 
temporal order, that the cause actually precedes the effect, harder to 
specify (2005:37).  
Bryman and Teevan suggest; “as sample size increases, sampling error decreases” (2005:224).    
A final collection rate of 280 out of 300 provided ample data for analysis. With 20 closed-ended 
questions, approximately 5600 individual data points were collected and inputted into SPSS
29
 for 
analysis. Additionally, the survey had two open-ended questions which respondents could 
answer. The response rate for open-ended questions was approximately 40%. Survey responses 
can be found in Appendix C. Response to the survey questionnaire was excellent with a return 
rate of 93%, reflecting an overall 9.3% of the total population. However, due to union resource 
and time constraints, it was decided to distribute surveys to workers utilizing union area 
representatives in each area of the plant. In all cases, the area union representative informally 
asked workers if they wanted to participate. With their agreement, workers filled out the survey 
and submitted the completed survey into a drop box at the in-plant union office. Although this 
was an effective process with excellent results, it introduced an element of nonprobability to the 
study. Given the uniqueness of the CAMI site, I contend sampling  methodology did not  
significantly reduce the reliability of sampling, even though, “in general, nonprobability 
sampling methods are regarded as less reliable than probability sampling methods” (Babbie, 
1992: 233). As with the survey questionnaire, focus groups sampling did not incorporate random 
selection and is representative of nonprobability sampling methodology.   
                                                 
29
 SPSS: IBM Statistical Product & Service Solutions.  System was provided by Brock ITS with all data 
stored on the Brock server and available for review.   
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A concern was raised about to the efficacy of the ordinal measurement structure of the cross 
sectional survey. Simply stated, the questions gave respondent three choices
30
 rather than four, 
which could have affected the outcome of the survey as the questions were not balanced. Upon 
reviewing the survey responses, six questions
31
 received heavy weighting in the middle choice. 
Questions 11 through 17 were related directly to risk while question 19 was concerned with the 
level of commitment to LMP arrangements. In hindsight, balancing the questions would have 
eliminated any ambiguity associated with these results. That said, I contend any ambiguity 
related to question weighting is relieved through the focus group and open ended question results 
which overall are in agreement with the cross-sectional survey results and the arguments raised 
in this paper. Additionally, it is important to note that of the questions which had significant 
middle choice result, the aggregate of 'agree' or 'somewhat agree' in all of these questions ranged 
from a low of 56.4% to a high of 94.3% with an overall 75.3% average. These results clearly 
support findings that suggest many CAMI workers overwhelmingly believe that; work is 
intensifying, workers are compelled to keep up, team leaders are collaborating with management 
while workers cooperate, workers are prepared to work without conflict, working conditions, 
wages, and benefits have worsened, management can't be trusted while the LMP is beneficial for 
both GM and the union. Lastly, my results are also similar to previous research on LMPs. In 
other words, there is nothing provocative about my findings which should raise any significant 
concern regarding the validity of the cross-sectional survey results.  
The qualitative-observational nature of focus group interviews raises some general concerns.   
Babbie quotes Richard Krueger on the disadvantages of focus group methodology, suggesting 
                                                 
30
 Survey question measures were: very much agree, somewhat agree, disagree.   
31
 Questions 11, 12,13,14,17 and 19 received >50% of respondent answers in the “somewhat agree” 
category.  It is reasonable to suggest that the inclusion of an additional measure, “somewhat disagree” 
might have changed the outcome of these questions.   
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that “focus groups afford the researcher less control than individual interviews; data are difficult 
to analyze; moderators require special skills; difference between groups can be troublesome; 
groups are difficult to assemble; and the discussion must be conducted in a conducive 
environment” (1992:255). Lastly, data collected from focus group interviews did not undergo 
SPSS coding or analysis.   
 Secondary analysis
32
 was an aspect of this study. LMPs have existed in Great Britain and the 
European Community for over 20 years, allowing sociologists and labour relations experts to 
research the value of LMPs from differing perspectives. In comparison, North American research 
on LMPs is limited.  This is partially due to the fact that outside of CAMI, it is difficult to find 
any existing formal LMPs in North America. To enhance my research, I relied on articles from 
both Europe and North America. By contrasting and comparing my findings to existing 
literature, it was my intention to add credibility to my study. Articles from Smith, Lucio, Stuart, 
Murray, Levesque, Vallee, Rinehart and Rolfsen and others have been cited in my work.  
However, secondary analysis has its limitations.  According to Bryman and Teevan (2005:134), 
it is difficult to assess the quality of academic work when it is completed by someone else. The 
new researcher has no control over data quality, and lacks familiarity with complex data supplied 
by others.  In this regard, an element of risk resides when citing outside sources.   
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 Secondary analysis is a form of research in which the data collected and processed by one researcher are 
reanalyzed, often for a different purpose, by another. Also known as secondary data. Babbie (1992: 281) 
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3.5  Ethical Considerations 
 Any research associated with Brock University that involves living human subjects requires a 
review process and approval from the Research Ethics Board (REB)
33
 prior to commencement.  
Assuring participant anonymity and confidentiality is a crucial aspect of living human subject 
research. In respect to this project, CAMI is a thriving work environment in which many social 
dynamics exist. The topic of the CAMI LMP and its associated risks to workers is important to 
the union, and to workers. As such, the researcher must ensure that participants not only feel 
secure in the research environment, but that they are not purposefully or indirectly harmed as a 
result of the research process.  
 Application for ethical review of research involving human participants was submitted to the 
REB for review and approval. The REB reviewed the research proposal and found that certain 
aspects of the research required clarification. Final approval to conduct this study was given by 
the REB under file# 11-274 SMITH on May 17th, 2012. Additionally, a modification to the 
original REB application to include a survey questionnaire was submitted to the committee and 
approved on September 10
th
, 2012.    
3.6  Chapter Summary. 
This chapter focused on describing the research framework of the study, including the 
methods employed in the development and execution of the cross-sectional survey and the focus 
group sessions. Additionally, the chapter outlined the major limitations to the research as 
determined by the researcher.   
 
                                                 
33
  For a full explanation of ethics policy and procedure related to research with humans, please visit 
www.brocku.ca and go to Office of Research Services. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Data Analysis & Findings 
 
4.1  Introduction   
This chapter will explore the findings obtained from three sources: the survey questionnaire, 
focus group interviews and documents made available to the researcher by the union. In 
restating the research question, I was concerned with revealing and understanding risks to 
unionized CAMI workers under the existing LMP agreement. Research has found that risk to 
CAMI workers has increased under the current LMP arrangement.  Past studies have revealed a 
steady erosion of worker commitment to lean production. Much of this is related to structural 
changes made by management to original JPM methodologies, practices and the LMP 
arrangement. Since commencing production, CAMI workers have identified many negative 
aspects of their LMP that required labour-union job action and worker support to achieve 
change. Major examples are: andon cord modifications, kaizen manipulation, intensification of 
assembly line work, and the lack of reciprocal obligation for workers. In more recent years, the 
company introduced a two-tier worker compensation system, CAMI’s response to the pressures 
of the global market and the deep recession of 2008-09. In a nutshell, full time (FT) workers 
were afforded all the protections of the CAW contract; SWE received a substantially reduced 
compensation package, with limited shop-floor rights and negligible union security. The 
following sections will reveal how distributive and political risks have increased at CAMI. As 
well, findings also indicate how CAMI Automotive has selectively withdrawn from many of its 
LMP commitments.    
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4.2 Distributive Risks: Contract Review  
At a fundamental level, risk can be evaluated through reviewing the performance of the 
collective agreement over time. Since 1998, the union has negotiated five collective agreements 
over a fifteen-year span. The first agreement (1989) was mutually agreed to by both parties 
without the use of a contract ratification vote. In return, the union was granted voluntary 
recognition, albeit with a wage and benefit package that was below the established industry 
standard at that time. After a difficult five-week strike (1992), workers achieved wage parity
34
 
with other CAW represented automotive plants on Ontario.  Base wages
35
 started at $23.23/hour 
in 1998 and rose to $33.58/hour in 2007. When compared to the average Canadian 
manufacturing worker
36
 during the same timeframe, CAMI generally outperformed the sector.  
The sector average increase was 1.9% from 2003 to 2012 with CAMI averaging 2.4%.  
However, in the union’s seventh contract (2007-10), wages flattened out during the final two 
years of the contract, with the base wage increasing at only 0.9% per year.  The eighth and latest 
contract had CAMI workers giving back 0.08% in the first year, with no increases during the 
final two years. When compared to the manufacturing sector from 2008 through 2012, CAMI 
workers fared quite poorly, averaging 0.34% against the sector average of 1.7%.    
                                                 
34
 Since the strike, CAMI workers have maintained relative wage parity with other CAW represented auto-
assembly plants.  Wages have been compared against the overall manufacturing sector as I was unable to 
locate any non-union assembly-plant wage information to compare against CAMI.  It would have been 
useful to compare how non-union autoworkers workers fared against their unionized counterparts over the 
same timeframe.    
35
 For the purposes of this study, I have chosen to review the production associate class, as it represents the 
majority of workers at the plant.  In my study, Production Associates were 65.7% of the sample population.   
36
 Comparison data was drawn from labour.gc.ca:  Major Wage settlements by year and Sector. See 
http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/labour/labour_relations/info_analysis/datas/wages/wages_year_sector.shtml 
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On September 20
th
, 2010, the union entered into an agreement with CAMI on the use of 
SWE in the workforce. Letter 60
37
 specifically outlines wages, benefits and security agreements 
for SWE workers. In their agreement, SWE workers receive 70% of the full base rate 
established for FT workers. In other words, SWE workers are receiving $23.91/hour as 
compared to the $34.15/hour enjoyed by FT workers doing the same jobs. When compared to 
FT rates, the SWE rate reflects the 1999 FT rate. Adding insult to injury, shift premiums are 
calculated from base wage rates, with SWE workers further exploited as they receive 50 cents 
less an hour when compared to their FT counterparts. 
For the first time ever, CAMI workers fell below the industry average as real-wage risk was 
evidenced in the current contract. The CAMI contract is set to expire on September 16
th
, 2013.  
In September, 2012, all other CAW-GM workers completed their master collective bargaining 
agreement
38
. The term of this new contract was extended to four years, expiring on September 
19
th
, 2016. The highlights of the agreement are that base wages
39
 remain the same for the 
duration of the contract, pensions are unchanged, health care benefits are basically unchanged, 
and the opportunity
40
 opens up for SWE workers to transition to FT. Excluding the minor 
victory for SWE rights, Big Three
41
 pattern bargaining did very little for auto workers in terms 
of improvements. In essence, they succeeded only in resisting the many concessions that GM 
had demanded.   
                                                 
37
 Letter 60 can be found in the CAMI Automotive and CAW Local 88 Collective Agreement, effective 
September 20, 2010 to September 16, 2013.   Letters in the contract are similar to memorandums of 
understanding.   
38
 CAMI is not part of the pattern bargaining agreement that GM has with the CAW union.  This exclusion 
was part of their original LMP agreement.  Information gathered from CAW-Canada Bargaining Report, 
September 2012://www.caw.ca/assets/images/34898_CAW-GM_Report.pdf 
39
 It is important to note that CAMI’s base wage is 4 cents/hour less than the base rate for Oshawa and St 
Catharines.    
40
 SWE workers now have a pathway to becoming FT workers.  GM is also more limited in its use of SWE 
hiring practice. 
41
 Pattern bargaining is a CAW strategy that attempts to ensure  General Motor, Ford and Chrysler workers 
are all treated the same. 
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As with their wages, CAMI workers have also experienced erosion in their benefit plan.  For 
the purposes of this study, I have restricted my analysis to shift premiums, vacation entitlement 
and rest periods. Shift premiums have remained the same since the fourth contract.  At $1.70 
and $3.41 respectively, shift premiums are the same as all other CAW-represented 
autoworkers
42
. CAMI workers had experienced continual improvement in their vacation 
entitlement from 1998 through to 2010. However the current contract saw vacation entitlement 
clawed back for low seniority workers. Workers with 1 to 3 years of seniority had their 
vacations reduced by a total of 3 days, reverting back to 2 weeks plus 1 day for those with 2 to 3 
years seniority.  In effect, this change reflects 2001-2004 vacation levels. In comparison to other 
CAW autoworkers, CAMI workers receive similar vacation entitlement.   
Rest periods are important to all workers. In particular, coffee breaks are essential to CAMI 
workers as they are subjected to intensified work under lean manufacturing methodology. In 
other words, workers at CAMI require more downtime to physically and mentally recover 
during their shifts. Initially, CAMI recognized the need for worker recovery and from 1998 to 
2009, rest periods in the plant consisted of two 18-minute breaks/0.5 shift. That all changed in 
2010, and under the current contract, rest periods have been reduced significantly to 10 
minutes/0.5shift, a total reduction of 16 minutes/shift or 44% for each worker. This change 
increased worked hours on the assembly while at the same time reducing rest period benefit by 
$8.88/shift to each worker. Over a 250-day work-year, this translates to approximately $2,200 in 
lost benefits to each worker, or $6,600,000 based on the entire CAMI workforce.  In contrast to 
the benefit erosion experienced by workers, the company gains the same amount in new-found 
labour productivity. GM now recovers wages directly in the form of productivity where in the 
                                                 
42
 Found in How Much do Autoworkers Really Make? By Jim Stanford, April 21, 2009. See; 
http://www.caw.ca/assets/pdf/Whats_YOUR_All-in_Hourly_Labour_Cost.pdf 
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past they were absorbed as benefit costs under the preexisting production arrangement. In one 
year, this means the company has gained approximately 188,521 hours of additional labour 
from the CAMI workforce at no extra cost.   
   
4.3  Distributive Risks: Grievance Summary 
For the purposes of this study, I was able to secure individual grievance information as 
retained by the union for each of the last four years. As such, I categorized grievance 
information by sex and grievance type for 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.  
 
Grievance Summary43 
 By Sex and Type 
2009 – 2012* 
 2012 totals were annualized for comparison purposes 
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 Grievance data was supplied for years 2009 through 2012. Previous years were not available for 
comparison.   
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
2009 2010 2011 2012 
* total 
*total F 
*total M 
*group 
%disciplinary 
%procedural 
%disciplinary M 
%disciplinary F 
 52 
 The analysis of grievances is intended to provide information on how workers are 
responding to management tactics on the shop floor. Grievances generally reflect serious 
matters in labour-management relations. And because grievances reflect workers real concerns, 
it is reasonable to include these results in the determination of tangible risk to workers.   
In December, 2009, General Motors of Canada and Suzuki Motors announced that GM had 
purchased Suzuki’s share of CAMI Automotive.  GM took ownership in 2010, and with it came 
an immediate increase in the number of grievance issues year over year. In 2009, total 
grievances were 121.  Of the 121 grievances, 70.2% were male, 23.1% female with 6.7% 
representing policy grievances. With a 2009 workforce of approximately 2150, the grievance to 
worker ratio was 5.6%. In 2010, the first full year with GM at the management helm, grievances 
increased to 207, with 81.6% issued by males, 13% by female workers and 5.4% deemed policy 
grievances. With a 2010 workforce of approximately 2450, the grievance to worker ratio was 
8.5%.   
In 2011, the total number of grievances declined to 187, with 81.8% issued by male workers, 
15% by females, with the remaining 3.2% deemed policy grievances. Hiring rose in 2011 to a 
level of 2938 as demand for CAMI-made vehicles increased, resulting in a grievance-to-worker 
ratio of 6.4%. Annualized results for 2012 suggest a continued decline in grievances issued with 
a projected 157 for the year, with 75.9% issued by males, 17.7% by female workers, and 6.4% 
policy grievances. With approximately 3000 workers today, the grievance-to-worker ratio is 
projected to be 5.2%. The results show grievance volumes on the decline as the workforce 
increases. With 2012 grievance results settled in at approximately 5.2%, the use of grievances to 
resolve shop-floor issues had dropped back to 2009 levels. The decline of grievance use in 2012 
is difficult to explain. Regardless, the reasons for grievance have also shifted dramatically.  The 
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next section will show how workers are now using the grievance procedure to promote their 
individual power more effectively.   
Measuring the type of grievances issued can also illuminate how workers perceive risk on the 
shop floor. For the purposes of this study, I have categorized grievances as either disciplinary or 
procedural. Grievances categorized as discipline reflect workers contesting reprimands, 
warnings, suspensions, or terminations. Grievances categorized as procedural encompass 
concerns over working conditions, wage and benefit disputes, health and safety, work standards, 
and human rights violations to name a few.   
In 2009, grievances filed for disciplinary-related issues were 28.1% of the total, with 
procedural grievances representing the largest category at 71.9%. This result suggests that 
CAMI workers and its union were more focused on structural concerns over individual security 
or performance issues. Further, the low level of disciplinary grievances in 2009 suggests that 
managers and workers were able to work out their differences prior to using the grievance 
procedure. That said, in 2010, grievances filed for disciplinary related issues rose to 51.2% of 
the total, with procedural grievances now representing only 48.8%. The dramatic swing in 
grievance type clearly coincides with the change in ownership to GM.  Not much changed in the 
subsequent two years, with disciplinary grievances remaining steady at 50.5%. The astounding 
change in grievance type suggests a major shift in both management philosophy and operating 
practice on the CAMI shop floor. Workers were now being challenged on a more active level by 
management on performance issues.   
Although performance-related disciplinary action remains a real concern for workers, focus 
group discussions revealed absenteeism and substantiation-related
44
 disciplinary action against 
                                                 
44
 Substantiation: refers to workers ability to substantiate any absenteeism they incur.  If workers fail to 
provide reasons (documented proof in many cases), they are disciplined.   
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workers ranked high on management’s agenda. According to workers, high levels of 
absenteeism in the plant related directly to the mandatory six day work week and the continued 
intensification of workload. When asked about workload, a focus group participant responded, 
“work has intensified. The initial speed of the line was 3.2 minutes; today it’s less than a 
minute…57 seconds”. Workers are tired and frustrated by the lack of management empathy 
related to their work-life balance issues. They need time to heal and recoup from their work, and 
they need time to spend with their family and friends. According to workers, it has never been 
easy working at CAMI, but a change for the worse has occurred recently. On the question of 
GM influence, one FT worker during the focus group sessions said “their goal is to scare 
everybody into doing what they need done to get cars out” adding “this isn’t a partnership”.   
 
4.4  On Risk & LMP Commitment: Survey Results  
Ten questions (10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 20) are related to the two types of risk 
that are associated with LMP partnership arrangements. These questions were intended to 
determine how workers perceived risk within their workplace. Nine questions (7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 
15, 16, 17 and 19) provided insight into CAMI management’s commitment to the prescribed 
values and outcomes of LMP partnership arrangements. I propose that management’s lower 
commitment level to LMP values and outcomes is related directly to a subsequent higher level 
of distributive and political risk faced by workers on the shop floor. In this section, I will 
comment on the survey findings in relations to risk and management’s commitment to LMP 
values and outcomes.   
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4.4a  Distributive & Political Risk  
Analysis of the union contract and available grievance information has shown increased 
distributive risk related to wages, benefits, health and safety, and worker employment security.  
As the company pushes to intensify the labour process through labour-saving strategies and 
reduced takt time, workers continue to feel compelled to do more, regardless of the increased 
pressure to perform.  Approximately 71% of respondents  very much agreed or somewhat agreed 
that even though work levels have steadily intensified, they felt compelled to keep up and do 
more for the good of the company. Only 29.3% disagreed with the question on intensified 
workload and willingness to do more for the company. This result reveals two important points. 
Firstly, by agreeing with the statement, workers have acknowledged the continued intensification 
of work on the shop floor. Secondly, the majority of respondents appear to remain supportive of 
a fundamental LMP value, enterprise success. Workers’ willingness to work harder for the good 
of the company conflicts directly with the real effects of intensified work on labour.  
Understandably, workers are concerned. In another question, 48% of all respondents felt working 
conditions on the floor had worsened with 34.4% suggesting nothing has changed. With 82.4% 
of workers responding to similar or worsening conditions, only 17.6% believed working 
conditions have improved. As reported by one worker, “the company cares more for the numbers 
than the workers, as we get older, we are working harder, heavier jobs, 6 days a week with no 
downtime for our bodies to heal and recover”. This statement supports the notion that workers 
have rightly identified worsening conditions while still supporting the company. Although 
workers are supportive of the LMP value of enterprise, or company success, they want 
improvements. The question of worsening conditions on the shop floor also relates to an 
important LMP value on the quality of work life. With the near majority of respondents 
 56 
suggesting worsening shop-floor conditions, the company has failed to commit to LMP 
principles pertaining to the quality of work life.  As focus group participants stated, there is an 
“erosion of quality of life”, with one worker in the group raising personal concerns about being 
“overworked physically and mentally”.   
When asked directly how they viewed benefits, wages and job security, 66.7% of workers in 
the survey believe conditions have worsened, 26.5% suggest no real changes, and 6.8% of 
workers believe conditions have improved. These results accord with my analysis of the contract 
and the grievance files. The contract summary clearly shows how wages and benefits have 
declined. Of particular concern, the SWE agreement allows the company to exercise its 
management rights related to worker security in a much more subjective and arbitrary manner.  
The large gap in wage and employment security between FT and SWE reveals significant 
present and future risk to all CAMI workers. The effective use of SWE by management is so 
substantial in terms of risk to both types of workers that it will require a separate section 
following this discussion. However, to conclude the discussion on distributive risks, the 
reductions in wage and benefits, the use of SWE workers, and the intensification of work proves 
how workers at CAMI have experienced and continue to be prone to a variety of distributive 
risks under the current LMP arrangements.  
Many of the questions asked in the survey were intended to reveal how susceptible workers 
are to political risk under the current LMP. Political risk is associated with the effects that LMPs 
have on the displacement of unions as the legitimate agent for workers. In other words, unions 
can find themselves displaced within the dynamic of the workplace through formal and informal 
relations achieved through the manipulation and use of team leaders, group leaders, workers, 
team concept, kaizen programs, and other collaborative mechanisms normally associated with 
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lean manufacturing, JPM, and LMPs. Measuring how close workers are to management will 
assist in determining their exposure to increased political risk. Rolfsen warned against the effects 
of a cozy relationship between management and union. As the line of demarcation blurs under 
the conventions of LMPs, it is important for unions and workers to manage collaboration and 
conflict equally if they want to maintain their bargaining power. 
CAMI workers have never shied away from doing the right things on the shop floor for 
productive efficiency or quality. With 96.1% of all respondents agreeing to the importance of 
worker cooperation with management, workers appear to be doing their part in support of key 
LMP values related to success and involvement. But how exactly does this high level of 
commitment play itself out for workers? It was difficult to any find evidence that workers were 
actually benefiting from their high levels of commitment. On the other hand, GM is doing very 
well.  In an independent performance and productivity evaluation carried out by the Harbour 
Reporting
45
 Group, CAMI ranked as the fifth most efficient auto assembly plant in North 
America through 2007. So, it’s clear that GM has benefited from its LMP arrangement with its 
workers.    
Whether they know it or not, workers are performing in the manner prescribed by LMP 
principles. Underlying their commitment to collaboration is a unanimous belief that the company 
must remain financially successful. In fact, 99.6% of all respondents agreed with the LMP tenet 
that the company must be kept profitable. With only 0.4%, or one respondent out of 280 in 
disagreement, the survey result on financial success is overwhelmingly in support of CAMI 
making money. Workers are prepared to support the LMP notion of financial success.  Although 
                                                 
45
 As reported in an article by Jim Stanford, Productivity in the North American Auto Assembly Industry, 
1998-2007 at  http://www.caw.ca/assets/images/Productivity_in_N_American_Auto_Assembly_CAW_Jan_09.pdf 
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this result does suggest workers support CAMI success, workers understand the relationship 
between jobs and profitability.  
For many companies, profit and return on investment for shareholders remain important 
criteria in determining future financial consideration and support. In other words, if a facility 
cannot meet certain financial benchmarks, it faces the risk of closure. Autoworkers have 
experienced countless plant closures in North America, including the closure of NUMMI 
Automotive in California. During the focus group sessions, workers commented extensively on 
the fear of closure. Many concerns were raised over job security and the increased competition 
for new products and models going forward. As an example, a male assembly line worker clearly 
stated that his main concerns remain “job security, safety and retirement”. So, workers realize 
the need for companies to be profitable and, at CAMI, are prepared to do their part to achieve 
that outcome. However, in return, they expect to receive a “fair wage”, a safe workplace, and job 
security. Challenged to cooperate with management for survival, workers need to be mindful that 
cooperation without conflict could lead to an increased exposure to both distributive and political 
risk.   
The importance of union voice cannot be underestimated when working under the constant 
pressures associated with lean manufacturing. Workers need to have the highest level of 
confidence that their union is an equal partner with the company when it comes to working 
through complex issues related to the rigors of the assembly plant floor. Of the survey 
respondents, 79.3% of the participants believed that the company respects the role of the union 
as the voice of the worker, with 20.7% disagreeing with the statement. Although this response 
appears to validate the LMP commitment to union recognition and respect, I found related 
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questions
46
 conflicted with this result. Political risk appears to be mounting against the union 
through the transformation of CAMI operational practices and policy aimed at productivity 
improvement and cost reduction. In other words, management is gradually eroding union power.  
Workers have noticed this within the workplace dynamic, and although the majority of 
respondents find the company respects the union as the voice of the worker, I suspect this result 
more closely reflects their view towards contract rights related to union representation and not 
the LMP and worker experiences on the assembly line floor.   
Having an open and transparent relationship is considered important under the TUC’s 
partnership model. I asked workers to respond to the company’s performance in regard to this 
important supplementary building block. It is important for CAMI workers to know that the 
company does not have a hidden agenda. Of course, workers were quick to recognize how the 
company has failed to live up to many of its commitments. Some examples of workers’ concerns 
related to this topic were raised during the focus group session.  When asked to comment on GM 
influence, one worker commented, “Suzuki people had integrity and they were good people, now 
we are GM”, with another adding “managements style and practice is not what they talk about”.   
In the survey questionnaire, 71.6% of worker respondents found the company failed to live up to 
this LMP building block. For effective relations to exist under LMP arrangements, workers need 
to believe that they can trust the company. However, the majority of worker respondents at 
CAMI believe the company has its own agenda, leaving workers wondering what the future 
holds.  Lack of transparency and hidden agendas have eroded any trust that had existed at the 
plant in the past.   
                                                 
46
 On questions related to LMP principles of transparency, trust, and the specific use of team leaders. See 
Appendix B, survey results. 
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Under the IPA LMP version, trust is considered an essential element to an effective 
partnership arrangement. According to the IPA doctrine, trust can only be gained through an 
established active relationship between the union and the company. But trust seems to be off the 
table for both the union and CAMI workers. On the topic of trust, 94.3% of all worker 
respondents agreed that management could not be trusted. When coupled with previous results, 
the lack of trust that workers have towards the company is not surprising. The company has 
eroded wages, benefits, and security provisions while leveraging its existing LMP at the expense 
of workers. However, this result conflicts with some of the earlier findings. With 96.1% of all 
respondents agreeing on the importance of workers cooperation with management, workers 
appear to be doing their part in support of key LMP values related to success and involvement. 
Why would CAMI workers cooperate with the company when they realize the truth about their 
LMP relationship? The fact remains that CAMI workers still enjoy a superior compensation 
package when compared to other manufacturing jobs that exist in Ontario. A FT worker 
lamented that his main concern was the “erosion of good paying manufacturing jobs”. It reflects 
his concern that if he lost his job, he knows that he will not be able to replace his current 
compensation package. In short CAMI workers are worried about losing their jobs and, along 
with their union, are prepared to do whatever is necessary to make CAMI work for them and the 
company.  
Combining the recognition of workers needs for security and the company’s need to 
maximize operational flexibility is a key tenet of the IPA doctrine. This idea is not new to the 
automotive industry.  It dates back to the notion of reciprocal obligation developed by the Toyota 
Automotive Company following the end of WWII. Under the Toyota program, workers toiled 
and in return they received higher wages and employment security. When CAMI was originally 
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formed, the union and the company agreed in principle to adopt many of the key components of 
lean manufacturing and elements of LMP agreements. In the early days at Toyota
47
, workers 
received a full set of rights including a guarantee of lifetime employment. Womack considered 
lifetime employment a key ingredient to lean and LMP. They believed “to make the system 
work, of course management must offer its full support to the factory work force and, when the 
auto market slumps, make sacrifices to ensure job security that has been historically offered only 
to valued professionals. It truly is a system of reciprocal obligation” (1990:102). Buried in the 
notion of reciprocal obligation, we find security and flexibility bound up together, representing 
the first key IPA supplementary building block.   
For all their effort, CAMI workers have not enjoyed any reciprocity. In my 2008 CAMI 
study, I noted: 
workers have not been afforded either life-time employment guarantees 
or a full set of rights.  CAMI workers have commented on how 
employment guarantees were philosophically discussed and supported 
under Suzuki management during the formative years.  However it soon 
became apparent to the union executive that the company was not 
prepared to formally agree to a no-layoff clause in the contract. By 1995, 
the company had abandoned its “no-layoff” rhetoric resulting in CAMI 
subsequently adopting an active layoff policy with the first layoffs 
occurring in 1996” (2008:69).    
 
For LMPs to be effective for workers and companies, formalized security (for workers) and 
flexibility (for employers) must be equally respected and upheld.   
I asked a series of questions in the survey to determine how the company had performed in 
meeting its commitments to reciprocal obligations under LPM guidelines. The following 
discussion represents how workers measured CAMI commitment. The question on intensified 
work has already been discussed, with 82.4% of worker respondents suggesting that working 
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conditions have either stayed the same or worsened over time. Only 17.6% of workers in the 
survey believe the shop floor has actually improved. Along with worsening conditions, layoffs 
have been initiated by management in combination with the creation and implementation of the 
two-tier worker classification. CAMI’s use of these cost-reduction initiatives illustrates their lack 
of commitment to important worker essentials in LMP arrangements.  Interestingly, even though 
workers understand all of this, they continue to commit to the LMP program. When asked if they 
felt compelled to keep up with workloads and to do more for the good of the company, 70.7% of 
all respondents agreed at some level. With only 29.3% disagreeing, the majority of workers in 
the survey are still prepared to do more for the company.   
Consistent with this result is worker willingness to cooperate with management to resolve 
issues collaboratively and without conflict. In respect to cooperation, 76.1% of worker 
respondents agreed that workers are more likely to work with management today than in the 
past. Similarly, 56.3% went on to state that they are prepared to resolve issues without conflict.  
In other words, CAMI workers are less likely than before to utilize grievance and arbitration to 
resolve workplace issues and concerns. This result appears to be supported by the reduction in 
workplace grievances over the last three years. Since spiking in 2010, the total number of 
grievances issued by workers at the plant has declined by approximately 25%
48
 over the last 
three years. On the surface, this result might seem a promising sign to labour relations optimists.  
However, further evidence will suggest that cooperation does not equate to workers necessarily 
buying into the present form of LMP, nor does it mean they are prepared to relinquish their 
power through embracing contradictory management ideology and practice.   
When it comes to trusting CAMI, 94.3% of worker respondents said they do not trust the 
company. When asked to rate workplace conditions, 82.4% think the plant is not improving at 
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all. With the progressive intensification of work through reduced team size, increased tasking 
and reduced takt time, workers are under significant management pressure to perform on a daily 
basis. On the topic of wages, benefits and security, 93.2% believed their contract provisions have 
either eroded or remained the same. The facts support this result, since 2010, wages and benefits 
have either declined slightly or remained unchanged
49
.  So, even though workers have responded 
positively to supporting CAMI and the LMP through cooperative and collaboratively measures, 
they are not ready to embrace the company wholeheartedly by abandoning their collective 
power. When asked to comment on the importance of union representation, 98.9% of all workers 
in the survey agreed that the CAW is vitally important to protect their worker rights.  The 
overwhelming response for union representation to protect worker rights contrasts with the 
unions and workers willingness to collaborate with management under the current LMP 
arrangements. This apparent contradiction works because the union has developed a complex 
relationship strategy whereby the union navigates and manages competing interests 
simultaneously.  
The ability to reconcile conflict and collaboration is an important attribute of LMPs. In an 
earlier study, Peetz (1996) concluded that conflict and collaboration are not mutually exclusive 
traits: 
It appears, then, that we have a paradox: unionization is enhanced both 
by cooperation and conflict. To understand this paradox, it is necessary to 
examine whether perceived union-management cooperation and 
participation in industrial conflict genuinely are mutually exclusive. In 
fact, the evidence from the surveys suggests that they are not mutually 
exclusive. Employees who had participated in industrial action at their 
current workplace were more likely than those who had not participated 
in such action to agree that unions cooperated with management. This 
does not imply that participation in industrial action promoted 
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perceptions of cooperativeness. Rather, it is more likely that employees 
who had favourable attitudes towards unions, arising in part from 
perceptions of union cooperativeness, were more inclined to support 
industrial action. The implication is that participation in industrial action 
is not incompatible with generally cooperative perceptions of union 
behaviour (1996:565). 
  
Rolfsen also found how labour can work closely with management in an LMP while 
simultaneously protecting its bargaining power. Both Peetz and Rolfsen stress the importance of 
union vigilance under LMP arrangements. In other words, “to protect a partnership on a long 
term basis, it also seems important that it is not exchanged for reduced benefits for union 
members, and to develop a strong union democracy” (2011:606). As such, it is reasonable to 
conclude that CAMI workers and their union have got it right from this perspective. It is not 
irrational for workers and unions to participate with companies to improve competitive 
advantage through LMP arrangements as long as workers are mindful to protect their rights. 
This explains how workers can be both supportive of the company while at the same time not 
trusting them to make good decisions on behalf of workers. In other words, CAMI workers have 
developed a unique set of social relations within the LMP workplace allowing them to cooperate 
without compromise. With 98.9% of workers supporting the union, it would be difficult for 
CAMI management to split and erode the union as had happened at NUMMI Freemont.  
Solidarity is alive and well at the CAMI plant. But trouble still lurks. Later I will discuss the use 
of SWE workers and the divisive nature of that arrangement.   
When it comes to assessing how workers view their existing LMP arrangement, the answer is 
clear. As already discussed, 70.8% of workers are prepared to accept intensified work to ensure 
the company succeeds. The majority of workers find management and workers resolving issues 
in a collaborative manner and without conflict. Over 79% of workers feel the company respects 
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the role of the union as the voice of the workers, reinforcing the notion that independent union 
representation is vital to any LMP relation. Most importantly, 99.6% believe it is important for 
CAMI to be financially successful. The combination of these findings illustrates the high level 
of understanding and awareness that CAMI workers and their union have in regards to their 
LMP arrangement with CAMI. On precisely that question, 79.3% of the workers participating in 
the survey responded favourably when asked if the LMP at CAMI works well for workers and 
the union. Before proceeding to the chapter summary, I will discuss the sensitive topic of SWEs 
and the two-tier worker classification. I asked one question on the survey to gauge worker 
opinion on SWEs and the results will be discussed next. However, it was in the focus group 
sessions and the open ended questions that the real narrative on the use of SWEs comes to life. 
Suffice to say, workers recognize the danger of SWE.  Not surprisingly, the findings illustrate 
how all workers are very concerned with the trend towards a tiered workforce.   
 
4.4b Two-Tier Wages & SWEs 
The use of SWEs raises a fundamental question of equality and worker rights. Equality and 
fair treatment of all workers remains a cornerstone objective for any progressive union.  So, is 
risk to SWEs comparable to that of their FT counterparts? To answer that question, risk to 
SWEs was approached from two distinct perspectives. The first risk relates to the terms and 
conditions of employment that potential worker-candidates are forced to accept in order to work 
at the plant. The second set of risks relates to the effect that the use of SWEs has on the various 
relationships within the plant. This section is primarily concerned with risk relationships that 
exist between, SWEs and supervisors, SWEs and FTs, and SWEs and the union.   
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In the survey, workers were asked if they agreed with having FT and SWE workers in 
CAMI.  Of the 280 respondents, 3 or 1.1% did not answer the question.  Of the remaining 277 
respondents, 17 or 6.1% very much agreed with having both SWE and FT workers, 69 or 24.9% 
somewhat agreed, and 191or 69% disagreed with having both SWE and FT workers in the plant.  
When the results were collapsed, 31% of the worker respondents agreed with the use of SWE 
with 69% in disagreement. The survey results clearly show the majority of CAMI workers 
would favour the removal of the SWE class, and the two-tier wage structure.   
Responses and comments gathered from the open-ended questions and focus group sessions 
amplify the results of the survey on the topic of SWEs. The focus group sessions were split into 
two categories, SWE and FT. The SWE interview group raised numerous concerns, including 
strained shop floor relations with other SWEs, FT workers, supervisors, and the union. The 
SWE group also identified very specific shortcomings related to their compensation packages 
and shop-floor rights and security provisions when compared to FT workers. To fully 
understand their concerns, I’ll turn to the collective bargaining agreement that exists between 
Local 88 and the company for answers.  
 The SWE benefit package is also unattractive when compared to FT workers. With no 
pension, they are also limited to 4% of their annual rate for vacation entitlement. Time off the 
line is important to all workers. They need their time off to recoup from the rigors of intensified 
work.  In this respect, SWE workers are again short changed when compared to FT workers.  FT 
workers are progressively entitled to more vacation
50
 based on their rising seniority. SWE 
workers are capped at two weeks. Without adequate time off, they expressed a growing 
frustration and anxiety towards a compensation structure that is clearly exploitive. As one SWE 
expressed, “the benefit/security provisions are more important than getting the FT rate”.   
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SWE workers are not adequately protected by the contract.  For the purpose of job selection, 
SWE seniority only works for them within the SWE classification, and only if the company 
deems them to have performed to company expectations. The qualifying criterion is therefore 
subjective and based on supervisory discretion. On the topic of overtime, SWEs are again 
subjected to second class status. The contract
51
 explains how SWEs, “will be entitled to 
overtime opportunities on a last to be asked basis by shift” (2010:187).  
Furthermore, SWE workers, regardless of their tenure in the company are always considered 
probationary employees. The definition of probationary worker can be found on page 13 of the 
CAMI-CAW Collective Agreement (2010-2013). In terms of probationary rights and protection 
for workers, the contract clearly states, “CAMI will be the sole judge of their ability and 
suitability for employment, and termination will be at CAMI’s discretion”. The use of the 
probationary designation allows the company to arbitrarily decide the fate of any SWE workers.  
Although SWE workers are represented by the union, the union grievance procedure does not 
protect them adequately, as the union’s power of arbitration is not afforded to SWE workers due 
to their permanent probationary status. Moreover, as previously mentioned, former EMD 
workers were allowed to displace SWE workers through an agreement that the CAW National 
made with GM upon the closure of the London facility. With 25 SWEs already displaced, 
another 115 are on the chopping block waiting for the day that their jobs will be eliminated in 
favour of the terminated EMD workers.   
The closing statement in Letter 60 encapsulates just how precarious the working relationship 
is between SWE and the company. It says that SWEs “will be treated as probationary employees 
in all aspects as described in the collective agreements unless specifically mentioned in this 
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memorandum” (2010:187). In the final analysis, wages, benefits and security provisions for 
SWEs fall far short when compared to FT workers. SWE workers are at risk and their 
predicament is well known and felt by FT workers. With the majority of survey respondents in 
agreement with abolishing the two-tier wage structure, it isn’t any wonder that I received a 
multitude of written responses (Appendix C) demanding that the SWE designation be 
eliminated in favour of FT status. Survey results in combination with worker comments 
illustrate the concern that all CAMI workers have related to the injustice that exists under the 
existing two-tier wage structure. The gap in wages, benefits, job mobility and security defines a 
relationship which is clearly exploitive of SWE workers. In other words, my research has 
established risk specific to SWE workers under the LMP arrangement.  
FT workers have also begun to realize the risk of SWE in relationship to their position in the 
plant as well. When asked about the two-tier structure, the majority of FT workers disapproved 
of the practice.  With 246 FT respondents, 166 or 67.5% of all full timers disagreed with having 
SWE.  Of the remaining 32.5%, 63 or 25.6% somewhat agreed with SWE while 17 or 6.9% 
agreed with the two-tier model. With 67.5% disapproving and a further 32.5% somewhat in 
favour, 93.1% of FT workers recognize or partially recognize the risk associated with having 
SWE in the plant. While FT workers have recognized risks associated with the two-tier structure 
on SWE workers, they have also associated increased risk to themselves. The following 
comments (Appendix C) from FT workers illustrate many of their concerns: 
SWEs in time could erode long term benefits and pensions. Once all the 
FT workers retire, this place will have a mock union of SWEs. I think 
their trying to get rid of us full timers for SWEs. Two tier workforce 
undermines unity. Pension erosion and cola must be maintained. Lack of 
solidarity as a union. The erosion of wages, holidays and pensions by 
GM. Two-tier wages are a poison that should be banned by government. 
Equal pay for equal work.  The workers do not stick together and it will 
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worsen with tier wages. Divide between FT and SWE.  Lack of 
solidarity, due to increase in unwelcomed intimidation from company to 
SWE workforce.  Workers pitted against each other. Maintain a strong 
union voice, push for rights of all workers, FT and SWEs.   
 
Comments from FT workers reflect a growing understanding of risk related to the continued 
acceptance of SWE workers at CAMI.  Full timers recognize that their own wages, rights, and 
security are now under pressure. As one FT worker suggested, we are on a “race to the bottom”.  
However, beyond personal financial risk, FT workers now regard the two-tier structure as 
damaging their collective strength and union solidarity. Many of the comments received point to 
a serious concern over the future of the union. With continued growth in SWE numbers, full 
timers believe that they may ultimately be the minority. In other words, if the SWE-to-FT ratio 
continues to increase, the ‘race to the bottom’ seems imminent.   
Fundamental worker security under the SWE arrangement is virtually nonexistent. As 
mentioned earlier, SWEs are considered perpetual probationary workers. And although they can 
utilize the grievance procedure, they do not have any access to arbitration, limiting the union’s 
ability to legitimately fight for them in any meaningful way. In comparison, FT workers would 
never accept giving up security rights that affords them a fighting chance to achieve workplace 
justice. So, full timers have now connected the risks associated with the use of SWEs to the 
potential erosion of their own rights and security. As such, they see the need to reverse the SWE 
program, not only for the SWEs, but as a way of reducing their own risk under the current LMP.  
Not surprisingly, SWEs find risk residing in all aspects of their CAMI relationship. They need 
to navigate relationships carefully within the plant walls, given the precarious nature of their 
status. The next section will discuss how risk is viewed within the various SWE relationships 
that exist at CAMI.   
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When it comes to supervisor-worker relations, SWEs are at risk. When directly asked in the 
survey if management could be trusted, 96.8% of all SWE respondents said no, slightly higher 
than the overall average. The lack of trust in management is rooted in the oppressive and 
unequal relationship that exists between the two groups. Although CAMI rules and regulations 
are intended to apply equally to all workers, the truth is something totally different. SWE 
workers are under constant pressure from management to perform in ways from which many of 
the FT workers are exempt. The focus group sessions revealed many interesting facts about life 
on the line for SWEs.  SWEs are under the constant gaze of management.  Considered easy prey 
for supervisors, SWEs know they must not only perform, but their performance must be equal to 
if not better than that of their FT counterparts.  Many examples were provided during the focus 
group, illuminating the high risk associated with SWE life at CAMI. One SWE strategically 
declined washroom breaks during her first six months at CAMI upon receiving a supervisor’s 
recommendation that taking washroom breaks was a ‘bad idea’.   
The added pressure of work extends to unrealistic expectations on attendance. Although 
pressure to attend work six days a week is universal in the plant for FT and SWE, SWEs feel 
additional pressure as they cannot miss any time without facing the real threat of discipline or 
termination. The additional SWE pressure resided in their lack of grievance and arbitration 
rights. As one SWE indicated, because they are always under the watchful eye of management, 
“SWEs need to be above and beyond” when it comes to performance related activities. The 
SWE worker-supervisor relationship at CAMI is similar in many ways to the subordinate-
confrontational relationship that exists for most workers, but theirs is experienced at an 
excessive level. This excessively oppressive relationship stems directly from their lack of rights.  
It quite simply could not exist if SWEs were afforded the same rights as FT workers.  From that 
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perspective, the supervisor-worker relation at CAMI generates a much higher level of risk for 
the SWE worker. Commenting on shop floor dynamics, a focus group participant concluded by 
saying, “SWEs are easy to prey on if management wants to”.   
Research suggests that the worker-worker relationship helps to mitigate workplace risk for 
SWEs at CAMI. To determine how this relationship works, I relied on focus group discussions 
and answers from the open-ended question portion of the cross-sectional survey.  FT workers 
appear to overwhelming support SWE workers, with many comments showing concern over the 
treatment of SWEs. FT workers understand how vulnerable SWEs are in the workplace. As one 
FT worker stated, “the company takes advantage of the SWEs by ruling with an iron fist and a 
great fear of losing their jobs if they don’t conform with management wishes”.  But perhaps the 
best evidence comes from the SWE focus group comments. In the conversation of shop-floor 
dynamics, they confidently suggested that most full timers do their best to protect SWEs. Full 
timers understand that SWEs have very limited job, exit, or labour market power. Using their 
own forms of power and union protections under the collective agreement, they often put 
themselves between the SWE worker and supervision. Interrupting the SWE-supervisor 
relationship in this way acts to provide the indirect transfer of some of their hard fought 
workplace power. This covert strategy of protection allows full timers’ to absorb management’s 
ill intention towards SWEs in a way that SWEs are protected through them. Their unselfish 
willingness to accept management blame and scrutiny to protect SWE is well known to SWE 
workers. However, there are FT workers that also take advantage of the SWE.  As commented 
on in the focus group “we need to be cautious of some FT workers. SWEs are used as 
scapegoats and pawns by some FT workers”. Although SWEs did cite how some FT workers 
made their work life more difficult, the general consensus amongst SWE participants was they 
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had a positive relationship with their FT counterparts. More importantly, even though some FT 
workers are prepared to protect them, SWEs realize that they “are easy to prey on if 
management wants to”.  
The final discussion in this section will be on worker-union relations. How do SWEs assess 
their unions’ performance and has the union done an adequate job in reducing risk to SWE 
workers?  By and large, SWEs are pleased with their union representation.  However, approval 
of the union does not translate into satisfaction with wages, benefits, or security provisions 
afforded to them in the collective agreement. When asked, they appeared to understand the 
history behind the inclusion of SWE in the 2010 contract, and the rationale for the two-tier 
system. One SWE commented the “union agreed to SWEs during the recession because at the 
time there were so many layoffs the executive underestimated SWE impact…seems like the 
union was out-negotiated”.  A bold statement, perhaps with some truth attached. The inclusion 
of SWE at the time likely reflected a union position which, in hindsight, paid too much attention 
to GM’s financial struggles while not providing adequate provisions for the protection and 
future elimination of the SWE program. Unions must always be wary of buying into corporate 
agendas, regardless of the threats or promises made. For its part today, the CAW is attempting 
to undo the SWE experience in Canada. In September 2012, the union published its CAW-
Canada/General Motors Bargaining Report
52
. In a message from Secretary-Treasurer Peter 
Kennedy, the union pushed for changes in the GM pattern collective agreement that would 
allow SWE workers to become full seniority members. According to Kennedy, the union was 
“determined to reject a permanent two-tier system. What’s at stake is the future of Canada’s 
middle class.  If high productivity jobs in the auto industry can’t pay decent wages and benefits, 
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to support a family, then no-one is safe” (2012:2).  The union was able to bargain for substantial 
change related to the use of SWEs in its Oshawa local. With CAMI bargaining commencing 
sometime in 2013, it seems reasonable to suggest that Local 88 will attempt to secure similar 
gains for SWE. It is important to note however that SWE use has not been eliminated at GM.  
There are certain conditions which allow the company to still utilize SWE workers in Oshawa.  
How this plays out for the hundreds of SWE workers in CAMI still remains to be seen.   
SWE workers will have their say when they join with FT workers to vote on the request by 
GM to go into early contract discussions. For their part, SWEs will be looking for full union 
representation and protection. When asked to comment on the importance of union voice, 83.8% 
of SWEs responded that they believe the company acknowledges the role of the union. They 
know in order to be treated as equals; SWE status and language must be eliminated. They will 
be pushing the union to take a strong position towards that end. As a voting group, they are now 
a recognized power within the local. As one SWE suggested, “SWEs have full voting rights on 
the contract. If SWEs go against the contract, they won’t be able to ratify”.   
 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter primarily focused on the empirical evidence provided from the cross-sectional 
survey.  Specifically, data was utilized to assess the level of risk to workers and the types of risk 
that workers faced at CAMI.  The high response rate to the cross-sectional survey allowed me to 
confidently arrive at the conclusions related to worker risk. The inclusion of focus group 
sessions further enhanced the empirical data provided by the cross-sectional survey.   
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
5.1 Distributive Risk on the Rise 
Firstly, the study found clear evidence that CAMI workers have been subjected to an 
increasing level of distributive risk. Responding to eroding profits, the company was successful 
in negotiating reductions in wages and benefits under the current contract. With Big Three 
pattern bargaining in 2012 providing no further increases over a four year term; it seems clear 
that CAMI workers should expect similar treatment from their employer when their contract 
expires in 2013. That was verified on Monday, January 21
st
, 2012; when The Globe & Mail 
reported that GM Canada was seeking to reopen the CAMI contract for early discussion 
(Keenan, 2013). In requesting the opening of negotiations seven months early, Kevin Williams, 
President of GM Canada, stated the company’s request comes amid their concern about how 
expensive it is to make vehicles in Canada compared to other countries. According to the 
article, Williams contends that “Canada continues to be the highest-cost producer for General 
Motors”. The article went on to suggest that CAMI workers should expect GM to offer them 
the same deal that other CAW workers ratified in 2012.  If CAMI workers agree to the 2012 
deal already in place in other GM plants, their base wage rate will remain unchanged through to 
2016. However, there is more at stake at CAMI than the risk to eroding wages and benefits.   
Buried within the GM announcement requesting early contract talks lies a vivid example of 
the truly coercive relationship between GM and its CAMI workers. The article mentions how 
GM is contemplating moving existing CAMI production models to plants in the US or Mexico 
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as early as 2015. By threatening product loss and possible plant closure or massive layoff, GM 
Canada is now hedging that its workers will succumb to the pressure of potential job loss by 
begrudgingly accepting a ‘no increase’ wage plan for the duration of the new contract. CAMI 
workers now have to decide if the company threat of closure is a real threat or a negotiating 
ploy to further reduce costs at their expense. It is still too early to determine whether GM is 
serious about moving production out of CAMI. However, the plant does appear to be critically 
important to GM’s ongoing success. The Globe & Mail reported that CAMI produced 305,414 
vehicles in 2012, more than 150% of its traditional measured ‘two shift’ capacity. The article 
went on to describe CAMI production as second only to the Fort Wayne pickup truck plant. 
Given the high rate of production under CAMI’s LMP arrangement, it is doubtful that GM 
would be moving production away from the Ingersoll facility at anytime soon. But for workers 
and the CAW executive committee, the threat remains real, and as they have in the past, they 
will be pressured by the company to accept a contract which is counter to the collective 
interests of all CAMI workers.   
The Globe & Mail article further frames the risks that exist for workers under the CAMI 
LMP. Research has shown how CAMI workers have suffered distributive risk under their 
current arrangement. Even as production soars and work further intensifies, CAMI workers are 
receiving less and less for their labour. This fact is made worse when considering the use of 
SWE workers at CAMI, forced to perform at peak levels for reduced wages and job security.  
More importantly, this all comes at a time when GM is raking in high levels of profit. On 
February 19
th
, 2013, the Associated Press released an article
53
 on how General Motors 
continues to turn profits despite losses in the European market. As a consolidated company, 
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GM has profited $13.4 billion dollars since the start of 2010. Not surprisingly, 2010 is the same 
year that CAMI began to take back wages and benefits from its Ingersoll workers. The article 
quotes how GM executives are optimistic that cost-cutting and 23 new vehicles by 2016 will 
help the overall profitability of the company.   
This entire cost-cutting program by GM at a time of high profit-taking solidifies my 
argument that CAMI workers continue to be exposed to distributive risk. Their LMP has not 
provided them with the any of the tangible advantages that supposedly come with lean 
manufacturing. They should be receiving higher wages and benefits for their efforts under 
lean’s intensified work program. They should also be entitled to a higher form of job security, 
but instead they have succumbed to a two-tier wage classification that provides nothing special 
to FT workers and virtually strips all security provisions away from the new SWE group of 
workers. And lastly, they should be sharing profits with GM, but instead they are asked to 
accept concessions under threat of closure. In short, distributive risk to CAMI workers has 
sharply increased since 2010 while GM and its management team have achieved productive 
gains and considerably enhanced profitability. When it comes to LMP arrangements, built-in 
flexibility benefits companies in shedding labour and keeping wages under control (Kelly, 
2004).  CAMI has not been an exception to this rule.   
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5.2 Political Risk under Alert 
Despite these pressures the union continues to perform.  Since the 1992 strike, the union has 
worked hard to protect the rights of CAMI workers. When asked about their union, 98.9% of 
the workers surveyed support the effort of their union. This positive result must be tempered 
with the knowledge that 93.2% are very concerned with eroding wages, benefits and security 
provisions. However, in spite of some controversial decisions made by the union in reaction 
during difficult economic conditions, this local has proven to be a strong union voice with 
worker-member support. But, the union needs to be very wary of GM given its recent track 
record and its insistence upon cost reduction at the expense of its workers. The introduction of 
SWEs represents the single greatest political risk to CAMI workers and their union.  Any two-
tier wage structure poses a real threat to union solidarity. Complicating matters even more so, 
today the workforce may be further splintered as SWEs are further alienated or displaced in 
favour of an external union pact with GM to bring in terminated EMD workers as FT CAMI 
workers.  
The divisiveness created by the two-tier system and the inclusion of EMD as FT workers 
threatens to undo the solidarity that has always existed in the plant. Responding to the unfair 
nature of this arrangement, a FT worker raised his concern with the fact that the CAW was 
“allowing EMD workers to bump SWE workers and the fact the CAW National was behind 
this”. In all likelihood, the two-tier class structure poses the greatest threat or political risk to 
the union. From this perspective, the NUMMI Motors example may indicate what is in store for 
CAMI workers if they continue to be divided. Splitting of the workforce under any 
management system hurts solidarity and brings with it the potential of increasing political risk 
to the union.   
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A final thought on the topic of political risk. Although the acceptance of SWE workers by 
the union has increased the potential for political risk to grow in the plant, I find the SWE 
agreement did not result from the state of a politically weakened union. I contend the union 
accepted the risk of SWE at a time when conditions in the plant appeared to support that 
decision. In other words, the union’s inability to foresee future growth coupled with their 
immediate concern at the time to bring in new jobs to CAMI, at any cost. These two conditions 
appeared to factor heavily in their decision to accept the two-tier structure. Given the 
opportunity to revisit that earlier decision, the union would likely pursue a different course of 
action today. However, to reduce political risk in the future, the union must resist 
compromising union values at all cost. If anything, the NUMMI experience should have taught 
LMP union executives that, to maintain solidarity they must not enter into provocative 
arrangements when collaborating with management. On a positive note, during pattern 
bargaining in 2012, the CAW National achieved positive changes in contract language to undo 
much of the SWE language in other automotive facilities. CAMI workers will benefit from 
those earlier CAW gains.   
 
5.3 Future Research 
My research was limited to CAMI Automotive. As such, it did not provide for a comparative 
risk analysis between traditional automotive assembly and LMPs. Future research on worker 
risk could involve comparing the CAMI LMP against other traditional unionized and non-
unionized assembly plants like GM (Oshawa), Ford (Oakville), and Toyota (Cambridge). 
The present research has revealed how SWE workers are exposed to exaggerated levels of 
distributive risk at CAMI. But the full story behind the acceptance and use of SWE at CAMI 
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still remains a relatively untold story. Why would the union accept SWE when it contradicts 
everything it stands for? This project failed to answer that question in any meaningful way.  
Further exploration into why unions make decisions that go against their members’ interest and 
founding principles would be worthwhile research.   
Workers suffer under LMP arrangements. Given the facts, why would unions decide to get 
into these types of arrangements in the first place? Again, my research did not attempt to reveal 
specific reasons behind the CAWs acceptance of the LMP partnership in 1988.  Finding out the 
reasons why unions are prepared to collaborate with management in LMP arrangements could 
unearth interesting facts about the state of unionism in the automotive sector and in the 
Canadian economy in general.   
 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, my research has found CAMI workers are exposed to both distributive and 
political risk under their current LMP arrangements. It has revealed the CAMI partnership to be 
a risk to workers. Under the intensified nature of work associated with lean production, CAMI 
workers are exposed to exaggerated forms of structural coercion, exploitation, and real 
subsumption. The existing partnership does not attempt to provide any reasonable level of 
reciprocal obligation related to guaranteed work for life: it does not provide workers with their 
fair share of profit in return for their intensified productive labour, and it does not allow them to 
participate as equals in determining how the LMP will operate on the shop floor. And when 
reflecting on the prescribed values that CAMI purports to uphold, workers respond with 
sarcasm: “open communication…keep your mouth shut, kaizen….work with what you have, 
team spirit….absolutely not, and the fourth one? I can’t remember”. In short, there is nothing 
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exceptional about the LMP relationship that benefits workers. CAMI workers have not received 
the quality of working life that was promised by the founders. Any commitment to employment 
security for workers has now been transformed into a two-tier wage structure that makes 
working at CAMI more risky than ever before. When it comes to openness and transparency, 
workers have no trust for management. And when workers were asked to consider how the 
LMP had benefited them, the majority has responded in the negative. The research 
overwhelmingly finds that, when it comes to following the LMP guidelines, CAMI has failed to 
apply the prescribed principles that are supposed to benefit its workers.    
However, the union executive must also accept a level of culpability for its role in increasing 
risk to workers. In particular, two events supported by the union deserve to be questioned.  
Accepting the two-tier wage classification and the EMD contract arrangement arguably 
increased the threat of distributive and political risk to all CAMI workers.  Given their exposure 
to risk under the LMP arrangement, it would be prudent for the union to now develop clear 
strategies to protect all its members. Workers need to protect their wages at all cost, and not 
trade away benefits for new or modified partnership agreements. In other words, the CAMI 
union must strategically focus its collective bargaining power by negotiating strong contract 
language that protects and builds worker rights under LMP arrangements.  
This strategy is well known to the CAW. “The CAW’s formula for progress is the 
combination of clearly identified bargaining priorities, a determination to make gains, and a 
commitment to generalize improvements from one workplace to other workplaces and other 
sectors. Equally important, in tough times we have resisted long-term agreements, gimmicky 
compensation schemes, and multi-tier wage systems. Where there have been setbacks, we have 
fought to limit them and prevent their spread to other workplaces” (Robertson/Murninghan, 
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2006:163). CAMI workers and the union can achieve these outcomes if they are prepared to, 
“maintain a strong union voice, and push for the rights of all workers, FT and SWEs” 
(male/FT/quality).   
Workers and unions have had little or no effect on influencing companies to abide by the 
principles associated with LMPs. Perhaps part of the solution lies with the state and legislative 
intervention. If unions could influence politicians to advance meaningful labour law that allows 
workers to enjoy the full benefit of LMP arrangements, risk could be reduced. From this 
perspective, the CAW National could step up its fight to alert lawmakers and others of the real 
threat to workers under LMP partnership agreements. With mounting risk, workers need labour 
law specifically related to LMPs that requires companies like CAMI to live up to their 
contractual commitments.   
Giving up on the notion that capital will ever live up to its LMP commitment to workers, 
Terry (2003) sees government intervention as the last viable solution.“Without them the 
partnership route may come to be seen not as a significant institutional innovation but as just 
another fashionable label, briefly adopted and then discarded, masking the parameters of the 
real task at hand”(2003:504). The problem is that getting government on the side of labour 
today appears to be nearly impossible. Examples of state “anti-union” sentiment in Canada are 
numerous. Just recently, the Ontario Provincial government forced restrictive contracts on 
teachers
54
 while the Government of Canada has intervened on numerous occasions to force 
workers back to work with unfair “back to work” legislation55.        
                                                 
54
 The Ontario government imposed a contract on teachers using Bill 115 in January, 2013.  See, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/story/2013/01/03/ontario-teachers-impose-contracts.html. 
 
55
 Governments threatened back to work legislation or imposed arbitration several times over the last few 
years.  Examples include 2007, Canadian National Railway (drivers), 2008, Toronto Transit workers, 2009, 
Canadian  National Railway  (engineers), 2011, Canada Post,  2011, Air Canada, 2012, Canadian Pacific 
Railway.  See http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2011/06/15/f-faq-back-to-work-legislation.html. 
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Evidence has shown the LMP system to be biased towards capital. It is a system that has 
been shown to be coercive, exploitative and alienating to workers. If CAMI cannot be trusted 
and state intervention is a utopian dream, there remains perhaps a single solution for CAW 
Local 88 to consider. Workers should question supporting a system that constantly intensifies 
their work while gradually increasing levels of distributive and political risk. The union and 
workers can effect positive change in their work environment if they chose to act. 
Acknowledging the risk of LMPs is the first step towards reshaping the relations in production 
at CAMI. Developing and implementing strategies that seek to reduce risk may require the 
union to openly reject many of its current commitments to the LMP. However, rejecting the 
tenets of lean and the current LMP will require careful deliberation and reflection on the part of 
the union and its workers. The company has profited under the current LMP, and GM will be 
eager to maintain and build on the existing arrangement.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 83 
References 
 
Anderson, Robert.    (1994).    Worker Commitment under Lean Production: A Case 
study of the Unionized CAMI Transplant in Ingersoll, Ontario. 
Department of Graduate Studies, The University of Western Ontario. 
Babbie, Earl.  (1992). The Practice of Social Research.   Belmont, California: 
Wadsworth Inc. 
Baccaro, Lucio, Chris Howell.   (2011).    A Common Neoliberal Trajectory: The 
Transformation of Industrial Relations in Advanced Capitalism.  Politics & 
Society, 39(4), 521-563 
Billyard, Doug.    (2008).    Lean Production in a Scarce Economy, Coping at CAMI.   
              Department of Labour Studies,  Brock University.    
Billyard, Doug.   (1992).     CAMI Automotive, Issues and Concerns Leading to the 
Strike.        Department of Labour Studies, Brock University.  
Bryman, Alan, James Teevan.  (2005).      Social Research Methods.   Ontario:  Oxford 
University Press.    
Buroway, Michael. (1979).   Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process Under 
Monopoly Capitalism.    Chicago and London:  The University of Chicago Press. 
Graham, Laurie.  (1989).   “On the line at Subaru-Isuzu: The Japanese Model and the 
American worker”. Pp 74-79 in North American Auto Unions in Crisis, Lean 
Production as Contested Terrain. by Green, William, and Ernest Yanarella, eds. 
(1996).  Albany:   State University of New York Press.    
Keenan, Greg.    (2013).    GM seeks to reopen CAMI plan pact. 
 Globe & Mail, Report on Business, Monday, January 21, 2013.  
 84 
Kelly, John.    (2004).     Social Partnership Agreements in Britain: Labor Cooperation 
and Compliance.    Industrial Relations,  Vol, 43 No. 1,  267-292. 
Lucio, Miguel, Mark Stuart.  (2005).  Partnership and new industrial relations in a risk 
society: an age of shotgun weddings and marriages of convenience?   Work, 
Employment and Society, 19(4), 797-817. 
Murray, Gregor, Christian Levesque and Guylaine Vallee.  (2000).   The Re-regulation of 
Labour in a Global Context: Conceptual Vignettes From Canada.    The Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 42 (2), 234-257. 
Parker, Mike. (1987).  “Industrial relations myths and shop-floor reality: the “team 
concept” in the auto industry”. Pp. 249-274 in Industrial Democracy in America, 
The ambiguous promise.  by Nelson Lichtenstein and John Howell, eds.   (1993).   
New York:    Cambridge University Press.    
Peetz, David.   (1996).    Unions, Conflict and the Dilemma of Co-operation. 
 Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 38, No. 4, December 1996, 548-570.  
Rinehart, James, Christopher Huxley, and David Robertson.   (1997).   
Just Another Car Factory? Lean Production and its Discontents.             
 New York:   Cornell University Press.     
Robertson, David, Bill Murninghan. (2006)    “Union Resistance and Union Renewal in 
the CAW”. Pp 161-183 in Paths to Union Renewal, Canadian Experiences.  by  
Kumar, Pradeep, Christopher Schenk (Eds.)    (2006).     Peterborough, Ontario:    
Broadview Press Ltd. 
Rolfsen, Monica.  (2011).   How close can we dance? Labour-management partnership on 
a borderline.  Economic and Industrial Democracy 32(4), 591-608. 
 85 
Samuel, Peter, Nicolas Bacon.    (2010).    The contents of partnership agreements in 
Britain 1990-2007.    Work, employment and society, Volume 24(3):430-448 
Smith, Murray E.G.   (2010).    Global Capitalism In Crisis. Karl Marx & the Decay of 
the Profit System.   Halifax and Winnipeg:   Fernwood Publishing. 
Smith, Tony.  (2000). Technology and Capital in the Age of Lean Production: A Marxian 
Critique of the New Economy.    Albany, New York:  SUNY Press.  
Terry, Michael.    (2003).    Partnership and the Future of Trade Unions in the UK.  
 Economic and Industrial Democracy Vol. 24(4): 485-507.   
Womack, James, Daniel T. Jones and Daniel Roos.  (1990).   The Machine that Changed 
the World.   New York:   Collier MacMillan Canada Inc.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 86 
Appendix A 
 
Self-Administered Questionnaire 
 
Department of Sociology/MACS 
Brock University 
 
 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
I, Doug Billyard, graduate student from the Department of Critical Sociology, Brock University, invite you to 
participate in a research project entitled ‘The Myth of Labour-Management Partnerships, Risk to Labour. A CAMI 
Automotive Study’.  The purpose of this study is to reveal and understand the associated risks that the CAMI labour-
management partnership has had on unionized workers.  Information collected from the survey questionnaire will be 
combined with previously collected focus group data. 
 
Your participation in this research questionnaire is completely voluntary and you are under no obligation to 
complete this survey. If you wish, you may decline to answer any questions or participate in any component of the 
study. Further, you may decide to withdraw completely from this study at any time and may do so at your discretion. 
The completion and submission of the survey indicates your consent to take part in this research project.  
 
Do not write your name or any contact information on the questionnaire as the research will be analyzed at the 
group level only. Participants cannot withdraw once they have submitted their responses as data are anonymous. Only 
the researcher will have access to the collected data.  All documentation will be retained until the completion of the 
project, at which time the material will be disposed of through mechanical shredding or e-file deletion, carried out by the 
researcher.   
    
The study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Research Ethics Board at Brock 
University (file#11-274-SMITH). If you have any comments or concerns about your rights as a participant, please 
contact the Research Ethics Office at (905) 688-5550, Ext. 3055, or email reb@brocku.ca. 
This research is intended to benefit academics, union officials and others in the field of labour studies.  Results of this 
study may be published in professional journals and presented at conferences. Feedback about this study will be made 
available to the union executive at CAMI upon completion of the project.  
All surveys should be completed and returned as soon as possible to meet the research deadline for inclusion.  Surveys 
can be returned online directly to dpbillyard@hotmail.com, or by hardcopy, to the in-plant union office for collection 
purposes.   
 
This research project has not received funding from any organization.  
 
Thank you for participating.  (You are invited to detach this cover letter for your records). 
 
 
 
Doug Billyard, Graduate Student   Dr. Murray.E.G. Smith 
Department of Critical Sociology,   Professor, Department of Sociology 
Brock University     Brock University  
dpbillyard@hotmail.com    688.5550  #4370 msmith@brocku.ca 
       Principal Investigator 
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Questionnaire.  Please check the appropriate responses for the following questions 
 
1.  Are you male or female? 
Male    __   
Female __ 
 
1.1. Please indicate your employment status with CAMI? 
a)  Full Time  __ 
b)  SWE         __ 
 
1.2. Please indicate your union status? 
a)  Committeeperson  __ 
b)  local executive      __ 
c)  union member      __ 
   
2.  Your age falls into which of the following categories? 
a)  Less than 30 __ 
b)  31 to 39       __ 
c)  40 to 49       __ 
d)  50 and over __ 
 
3.  How many years have you worked at CAMI in total? 
a)  less than 5      __ 
b)  6 to 10           __ 
c)  More than 11 __    
 
4.  Please indicate which area in the plant you are working in now? 
a)  Assembly   __ 
b)  Elsewhere __ please specify___________________________ 
 
5.  Your job classification can be described as: 
a)  Team Leader__ 
b)  PSG__ 
c)  PA__ 
d)  Skilled trades__ 
 
6.  Did you ever belong to a union before joining CAMI? 
a)  Yes __  
b)  No __ 
 
Please check the appropriate response for the following questions. 
 
7.  It’s important for workers to participate and cooperate with management while at work. 
a)  Very much agree__ 
b)  Somewhat agree __ 
c)  Disagree __ 
 
8.  It’s important for CAMI to be financially successful. 
a)  Very much agree__ 
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b)  Somewhat agree __ 
c)  Disagree __ 
 
9.  The company respects the role of the union as a voice for workers. 
a)  Very much agree__ 
b)  Somewhat agree __ 
c)  Disagree __ 
 
 
10.  The company is open and transparent with workers…there aren’t any hidden agendas. 
a)  Very much agree__ 
b)  Somewhat agree __ 
c)  Disagree __ 
 
11. Even though work levels have steadily intensified, I feel compelled to keep up and do more 
for the good of the company.   
a)  Very much agree__ 
b)  Somewhat agree __ 
c)  Disagree __ 
 
12.  More and more, team leaders are managing teams alongside management. 
a)  Very much agree__ 
b)  Somewhat agree __ 
c)  Disagree __ 
 
13.  Today, workers tend to cooperate with the management more than we did in past. 
a)  Very much agree__ 
b)  Somewhat agree __ 
c)  Disagree __ 
 
14.  Today, workers and management are more prepared to resolve issues collaboratively and 
without conflict.  
a)  Very much agree__ 
b)  Somewhat agree __ 
c)  Disagree __ 
 
15.  In my opinion, working conditions on the floor have; 
a)  improved  __ 
b)  worsened  __ 
c)  stayed  about the same __ 
 
16.   Overall, our benefits, wages, and job security have; 
a)  improved  __ 
b)  worsened  __ 
c)  stayed about the same __ 
 
17.  Management can’t be trusted. 
a)  Very much agree__ 
b)  Somewhat agree __ 
c)  Disagree __ 
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18.  Today, more than ever, workers need a strong union to protect their rights.   
a)  Very much agree __ 
b)  Somewhat agree __ 
c)  Disagree __ 
 
 
19.   The labour-management partnership that exists ( lean production, teams, and kaizen) at 
CAMI works well for workers and our union.  
a)  Very much agree__ 
b)  Somewhat agree __ 
c)  Disagree __ 
 
20.  I agree with having Full Time and SWE workers in CAMI. 
a)  Very much agree__ 
b)  Somewhat agree __ 
c)  Disagree __ 
 
 
 
 
 
21.  What are your major concerns in the plant?    
 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________ 
 
 
22. Do you have any suggestions for improving worker rights? 
 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix B 
 
Survey Results 
 
Q7: It’s important for workers to participate and cooperate with management while 
at work. 
 
 
This question is directly or indirectly related to IPA
56
 and LMP commitments #1,#2 and 
building blocks #1and #4.   In particular, the question relates to the success of the 
organization, building trust through involvement, commitment to the LMP processes, and 
achieving expected outcomes.  Of the 280 respondents at total of 279 answered the 
question with one missing. Of the 279 valid responses
57
, 93 or 33.3% of the responses 
very much agreed with the statement, 175, or 92.7% somewhat agreed, while 11 or 3.9% 
of the respondent population disagreed with the statement.  In summary, 278 responses, 
or 96% agreed or somewhat agreed with the statement, with 3.9% disagreeing.   
 
                                                 
56
 IPA refers to the Involvement and Participation Association  principles promoted by employer 
organizations and supported  
57
 Valid responses only consider those that actually chose  to answer the question and does not consider 
missing responses.   
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Q8: It’s important for CAMI to be financially successful. 
 
 
This question is directly related to commitment #1 of the IPA, and indirectly related to 
commitment #3, and building blocks #1 and #4.  Of the 280 respondents, all answered the 
question with no missing values.  Of the 280 valid responses, 248, or 88.6% very much 
agreed with the statement, 31 responses or 11.1% somewhat agreed, with only 1 
response, or 0.4% disagreeing with the statement.  In summary, 99.6% very much or 
somewhat agreed, with 0.4% not in agreement.   
 
Q9: The company respects the role of the union as a voice for workers. 
 
 
This question is directly related to commitments #2 and #3, and building blocks #2, #3, 
and #4.  Of the 280 respondents, all answered the question with no missing values. Of the 
280 respondents, 34, or 12.1% very much agreed with the statement, 188 or 67.1% 
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somewhat agreed, while 58, or 20.7% disagreed with the statement.  In summary,79.3% 
agreed or somewhat agreed, with 20.7% disagreeing.   
 
Q10: The company is open and transparent with workers…there aren’t any hidden 
agendas. 
 
This question is directly related to commitment #2, building trust through involvement.  
Of the 280 respondents, a total of 278 answered the question, with 2 missing values.  Of 
the 278 valid responses, 5, or 1.8% very much agreed with the statement, 74 or 26.6%, 
somewhat agreed, and 199 or 71.6% disagreed.  In summary, 29.4% agreed or somewhat 
agreed, with 71.6% disagreeing.   
 
Q11: Even though work levels have steadily intensified, I feel compelled to keep up 
and do more for the good of the company. 
 
 93 
This question relates to commitment #1 and building block #4.  Of the 280 respondents, 
all answered this question.  Of the 280 valid responses, 43 or 15.4% very much agreed 
with the statement, with 155 or 55.4% also somewhat agreeing.  The remaining 82 
respondents, or 29.3% of the total, disagreed with the statement.  In summary, 70.8% 
agreed very much or somewhat with 29.2% in disagreement.   
 
Q12: More and more, team leaders are managing teams alongside management. 
 
This question measures the influence of LMP/IPA in combination with neoliberal 
trajectories on workplace dynamics.  Of the 280 respondents, a total of 272 answered the 
question with 8 missing values.  Of the 272 total responses, 75 or 27.6% very much 
agreed with the statement, while 158 or 58.1% agreed.  The remaining 39 responses, or 
14.3%, disagreed with the statement. In summary, 85.7% agreed or somewhat agreed 
with the statement with 14.3% in disagreement.   
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Q13: Today, workers tend to cooperate with team management more than we did in 
the past. 
 
This question measures the influence of LMP/IPA in combination with neoliberal 
trajectories on workplace dynamics.  Of the 280 respondents, 276 answered the question 
with 4 missing values.  Of the 276 responses, 60 or 21.7% very much agreed with 150 or 
54.3% somewhat agreeing.  The remaining 66 or 23.9% disagreed with the statement.  In 
summary, 76.1% agreed or somewhat agreed, with 23.9% disagreeing. 
 
Q14: Today, workers and management are more prepared to resolve issues 
collaboratively and without conflict.    
 
This question relates directly to building block #1.  Of the 280 respondents, 279 answered 
the question with 1 missing value.  Of the 279 responses, 23 or 8.2% very much agreed 
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with 134 or 48% somewhat agreeing.  The remaining 122 or 43.7% disagreed with the 
statement.  In summary, 56.3% agreed or somewhat agreed with 43.7% disagreeing. 
 
Q15:  On working conditions on the floor. 
 
This question relates directly to TUC
58
 principle #5, quality of work life. Of the 280 
respondents, 279 answered the question with 1 missing value.  Of the 279 responses, 49 
or 17.6% believe working conditions have improved, while 134 or 48% responded that 
working conditions have worsened.  The remaining 96 or 34.4% believe working 
conditions have remained the same.  In summary, 82.4% believe conditions have 
remained the same or worsened with only 17.6% believing plant working conditions are 
improving.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58
 TUC is the Trades Union Congress in Britain.  Its principles are closely aligned with the IPA principles. 
The only difference between the two organizations principles is the TUC included a concern for quality of 
worklife.   
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Q16:  On benefits, wages and job security.   
 
This question relates directly to the sharing of enterprise success, commitment #1 and 
building block #4, commitment or recognition of employment security.  Of the 280 
respondents, 279 answered this question with 1 missing value.  Of the responses, 19 or 
6.8% believed there was improvement, with 186 or 66.7% in disagreement, suggesting 
benefits, wages and job security have worsened.  The remaining 74 or 26.5% believe 
benefits, wages and job security have remained unchanged.  In summary, 93.2% report 
worsening or no change to benefits, wages and security with just 6.8% believing these 
critical aspects have improved.   
 
Q17:  On the topic of trusting management. (Asked in the negative) 
 
Similar to Q10, this question relates directly to commitment # 2, building trust through 
involvement.  Of the 280 respondents, all answered this question. Of the responses, 115 
or 41.1% very much agreed with the statement, while 149 or 53.2% somewhat agreed. 
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The remaining 16 or 5.7% disagreed with the statement that management could not be 
trusted.  In summary, 94.3% agreed or somewhat agreed that management could not be 
trusted with only 5.7% in agreement. 
 
Q18:  On the importance of union representation for protection.  
 
This question is meant measure worker concerns related to the LMP.  Of the 280 
respondents, 279 answered the question with 1 missing value.  Of the 279 responses, 225 
or 80.6% very much agreed and 51, or 18.3% somewhat agreed.  The remaining 3, or 
1.1% disagreed with the statement.  In summary, 98.9% of workers agree or somewhat 
agree that the union is needed to protect their rights.   
 
Q19:  On the value of the LMP for workers and the union. 
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This question will be used to compare against all previous responses related to the LMP, 
principles, building blocks and commitments.  Of the 280 respondents, 279 answered the 
question with 1 missing value.  Of the responses, 28 or 10% agreed with 187, or 67% 
somewhat agreeing that the LMP works well for workers and the union.  The remaining 
64, or 22.9 disagreed with the statement.  In summary, 77.1% of all responses agreed or 
somewhat agreed that the LMP works well for workers.  Only 22.9% disagreed.   
 
Q20:  On the existing Two Tier Base Wage/Benefits/Security Agreement 
(SWE/Fulltime). 
 
This is a fundamental question on equality and worker rights.  The statement was “I agree 
with having FT and SWE workers at CAMI”. Of the 280 respondents, 277 rated the 
statement. Of the responses, 17 or 6.1% agreed with the statement with 69 or 24.9 
somewhat agreeing.  The remaining 191, or 69%, disagreed with the statement.  In 
summary, 31% appear to support the use of a two tier system while 69% disagree.   
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Appendix C 
 
CAMI  Focus Group Session & Open Ended Survey Answers 
 
SWE  Focus Group comments. 
-  Union dues for SWEs are less than for fulltime workers 
- Huge wage base difference 
- Shift premiums based on wage base, so $3.41 versus $2.91 creates a gap. 
- The alternative to being a SWE, walking the street. 
- $24 dollars is good pay. 
- We have a concern over benefits and security provision. 
- Want the collective agreement to apply to them. 
- Limited benefit plan. 
- No bereavement with pay, time off without pay. 
- No gate collection for SWEs reflects support for fulltime workers. 
- GM has eliminated all gate collections other that charity.  
- May 2010, last FT hiring 
- 6 year grow in for base wage, starting at 70%. 
- SWEs got a 30 cent/year raise, not considered wage, only a supplement so it’s not rolled in. 
- Wages are frozen. 
- Probation period for SWEs is 90 days…perform and don’t screw up…two things critical for 
SWEs..always. 
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On Shop floor dynamics 
- The first group of SWEs were treated like complete shit. 
- I did not take a washroom break for the first six months. 
- It was recommended to not take washroom breaks 
- Management watch’s every stinking little thing we are doing. 
- SWEs need to be above and beyond. 
- Union has done a good job getting things in place for SWEs, like union training. 
- SWEs are used as scapegoats and pawns by some fulltime workers. 
- SWEs need to be cautious of some fulltime workers. 
- Conversely, many fulltime workers take additional responsibility and protect SWEs from area 
leaders. 
- They ‘take the hit’ for SWEs. 
- Some fulltime workers with their ‘asses on the line’ will blame SWEs. 
- Some SWEs not allowed to have washroom breaks by team leaders. 
- There was a rumour that one SWE was required to pay the team leader to have a washroom 
break. 
- The treatment of SWEs on the line is similar to the fulltime workers, but the difference is 
SWEs are easy to prey on if management wants to.   
On SWE wants & needs 
- Full union representation. 
- Want to feel like I’m protected  
- I want a pension 
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- SWEs actually have lots of worker rights now. We have a major influence on the contract 
right now.   
- SWEs have full voting rights on the contract 
- If SWEs go against a contract, they won’t be able to ratify. 
- SWEs are the swing vote. 
- We exercise power through voting. 
- Many of the original full timers will be retiring within 10 years or so. 
- We need fulltime status, even with a different wage base than the existing structure. 
- The benefit/security provisions are more important than getting the fulltime rate. 
- SWEs are the new norm, going forward as fulltime workers disappear. 
- Workers in the plant, both fulltime and SWEs are prepared to do what is necessary to equalize 
wages in the plant. 
-  The union has managed to negotiate a lot of different things for the SWEs. 
- This is an active union. 
- Since GM has come in, things have changed dramatically. 
- There are pockets of mistreatment on the floor starting to be identified by both the union and 
the company. 
- One big difference between SWEs and fulltime is related to attendance. We don’t have the 
same union protection that they have.  
- Using the grievance procedure is difficult for SWEs, many don’t know how to use it. 
- SWEs are afraid to speak up and ask for representation. 
- SWEs approach problems differently than fulltime workers because of their status. SWEs use 
fulltime workers to exercise concerns and complaints. 
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- Union is very approachable for SWEs 
- Dan is fantastic. 
- There is an ‘eyes open, mouth shut’ approach for SWEs while working. 
- I wouldn’t give up my job here for anything. It’s one of the best jobs I’ve ever had. It’s also 
by far the easiest job I’ve ever had. 
- SWEs are a corporate strategy to break the union. 
- Union agreed to SWEs during the recession because at the time there were so many layoffs 
the executive underestimated SWE impact….seems like the union was out-negotiated.  
- All SWEs should have full benefits, coverage and security 
- All retired FT and vacated positions should be filled with SWEs, status changed. 
- The existing SWE/ fulltime balance should be maintained and there should be a cap on the 
number of SWEs in the plant at any given time.  
Full Time Focus Group Comments. 
- Relationship with management hasn’t changed. It was rough back then. And 23 years later, 
nothing has changed. 
- We are penalized for not being able to keep up with lean production. 
- There has been nothing progressive on the shop floor over 23 years in terms of continuous 
improvement. 
- Relationship on the floor is based on where your located. 
- Paint is mostly relaxed..if your tied to the assembly line, there is more antagonism around 
production. 
- Shop floor management fearful of not hitting the numbers. 
- New area leaders are more relaxed but in the end, what needs to get done, gets done. 
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- Area leaders do what they need to do to keep their jobs. 
- Areas take on the personality of the manager running it. 
On GM influence. 
- Big time influence on the floor. Their goal is to scare everybody into doing what they need 
done to get cars out.  
- Suzuki people had integrity and they were good people. 
- Now we are GM, fully fledged corrupt on the floor. 
- Less and less about making good products…it’s become about the numbers and downtime. 
- Management’s style and practice is not what they talk about. 
- There was a promise of something different, but it’s not. 
- Incentives are gone! 
- No special awards at all. 
- Staff benefits have been eroded as well. 
- Upper management doesn’t care about SWEs 
- The floor thinks they should be FT. 
- SWEs in time could erode long term benefits and pensions. 
- Non unionized jobs are now 10 to 12 dollars an hour for the same type of work as here. 
- CAMI hired well. We all have certain temperaments and work ethics they knew how to hire 
the best. 
- Race, culture and ethnic difference is abused by management in the plant. 
- 50% of workers have some sort of workplace injury like repetitive strain. 
- Many workers are high on prescription meds as they can’t get through the day. 
- Mandatory overtime now for three years 
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- Work has intensified. The initial speed of the line was 3.2 minutes, today it’s less than a 
minute…57 seconds. 
- Management redistributes workload rather than hire additional people. 
- Workers continue to find ways to get the work done. 
- There is more cooperation with management that has been here a while, but nothing happens 
without upstairs approval. 
- The union and management wouldn’t do the right thing so I had to call the ministry of labour 
myself to get the change. 
- You personally need to know the law to take care of yourself. 
- SWEs have become the necessary evil because of the economy. 
- We are competing with the states and we have to respond.  
- Once all the FT workers retire, this place will have a mock union of SWEs. 
- We’re all burning out and today we can’t work to our full potential. 
- There’s no time off. 
- I think their trying to get rid of us full timers for SWEs. 
- I’d rather have more coverage’s than base wage increases. 
- It’s hard to understand why GM doesn’t look after its workers better than they do..they 
should. 
- This isn’t a partnership! 
- They’re not following Deming’s principles. 
- On CAMI values; open communication…keep your mouth shut, kaizen…work with what you 
have, team spirit…absolutely not, and what’s the fourth one? I can’t remember.  
- When the ISO people come in for audits, they ask us to lie for them. 
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- What is the connection or disconnect between what the union says and what is actually 
happening on the floor…’no good deed goes unpunished’.   
 
Survey Question Open ended statements. 
Question 21.  What are your major concerns in the plant? 
- Management has its favourite workers, not always fair.  
(female/fulltime/assembly) 
- We should all be paid the same after working for a period of time. 
(female/fulltime/assembly) 
- New products, tension between SWE and eventually 2 tier workers, over use of 
discipline on floor.  (male/full time/assembly) 
- Lack of respect and trust between production workers.  (male/full time/assembly) 
- People doing same jobs for less money, more focus on employee issues.  
(male/SWE/Assembly) 
- The company takes advantage of the SWEs by ruling with an iron fist and a great 
fear of losing their jobs if they don’t conform with management wishes.  
Management has adopted the bullying tactics with all workers and expect us to 
work over 100% job load but still pay us for only 90% now.  More for less!  
(male/full time/assembly) 
- By allowing a two-tier system, such as our SWE program, it creates inequality in 
the workforce.  This results in conflict, division and resentment within the 
workforce.  Everyone should be able to eventually make full wages and benefits, 
using a graduated system.  (female/fulltime/assembly) 
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- The SWE problem, we don’t know where we stand...future etc...very little 
communication from union and management. (male/SWE/assembly) 
- Team sizes are too large (5-6 is plenty). Always short staffed..sharing PSG, T/L 
on line.  Time study numbers change suddenly.  (female/fulltime/assembly) 
- Making it to retirement and another product. (male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Lack of support from some of the reps. (male/fulltime/assembly) 
- People with different wages working side by side doing the same job, het one 
making less money.  (female/fulltime/assembly) 
- Job security, more out of pocket expenses for benefits, medical and dental. 
(male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Potential product loss to the states.  SWEs getting kicked out.  
(male/SWE/assembly) 
- Two tier system goes against what unions stand for “equality in the workplace”.  
SWE workers were only brought in to bridge the gap and start up of new product 
than they should be hired as “full time”. Some SWEs have been here 2 years.  
(male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Job security for all workers. Scare tactics imposed by management. Different 
treatment of full time members and SWEs. Longevity of employment. Not being 
informed about events occurring around the plant in a timely manner. 
(male/SWE/welding) 
- Two tier workforce undermines unity.  Pension erosion and cola must be 
maintained. (male/fulltime/stamping) 
- Lack of solidarity as a union.  (female/fulltime/stamping) 
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- To much movement of area leaders to lines where they are not aware of all the 
issues.  Management picking on SWEs and low seniority members and not high 
seniority members doing the same thing.  (male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Team leaders working on line everyday because of short staffing, people are 
being injured or becoming ill because of  6 day a week schedule and nobody 
available for relief to be able to take a day off. The amount of waste that is 
generated by this plant on a daily basis has increased significantly since becoming 
GM.  (female/fulltime/materials) 
- Making sure we build great vehicles so we can secure another product so we can 
make it to retirement.  (male/fulltime/stamping) 
- Credibility between the floor and management. (male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Being lied to by management. (male/fulltime/welding) 
- Job security, amount of injuries occurring due to increased line speed. The length 
of time grievances take to resolve. Equal representation management held 
accountable for their mistakes and also equal consequences for management and 
workers alike. The sacking of unions, company pitting workers against workers, 
the SWE;s not hired full time, cutting of wages.  (male/fulltime/welding) 
- Divisiveness created by a two tier labour system.  Health and safety compromised 
by a tendency for management to discipline a person who gets injured on the job.  
(male/fulltime/welding) 
- SWEs...different pay scales and benefits, line speeds and job loads, same concerns 
as 80 years ago.  (male/fulltime/welding) 
- Still having a job, need all SWEs to become fulltime. (male/fulltime/assembly) 
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- The erosion of wages, holidays and pensions by GM, (male/fulltime/paint) 
- I find the work gets done in spite of management.  The worker realizes their jobs 
futures are on the line at all times.  (male/fulltime/stamping) 
- Putting in my time for retirement.  I hate to keep giving back everything that the 
CAW has worked for.  What would Bob White say about us being pushovers?  I 
want my holidays and benefits back.  (male/fulltime/stamping) 
- Major concerns are manipulated time studies.  Managers play one ‘upmanship’ 
and discipline PA where it is not necessary. (female/fulltime/assembly) 
- That we have jobs for the future. (male/fulltime/assembly) 
- The company and union always seem to have their own agenda, not always to the 
benefit of the workers. (female/fulltime/welding) 
- Numbers over quality, contract area leaders, aging equipment and on six days a 
week and no time to fix.  (male/fulltime/welding) 
- Job process overloading. Under skilled area leaders. (male/fulltime/welding) 
- Job security, wages, pension, benefits. (male/fulltime/welding) 
- Race to the bottom against UAW. The weakening of the union. 
(male/fulltime/materials) 
- Get SWEs to be full time.  Still after 23 years, not sure about my job. Keep work 
in-house.  (male/fulltime/stamping) 
- SWEs should have hired fulltime with perhaps reduced benefits and language to 
protect their right to post for jobs and for vacation time.  Seems to be a distinct 
division between full time CAMI , pref hires and SWEs.  We are all CAMI 
employees. (female/fulltime/welding) 
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- New product for job security, pensions, plant moral.  Treatment of SWE workers 
by some full time and management.  (male/fulltime/welding) 
- Division among seniority. Making 11 dollars an hour less and being asked to go 
down to 15 an hour less than regular employees. (female/SWE/welding) 
- Job security and future work. Wage decreases in the future. SWE increased 
population needs to be capped.  (male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Workload, lack of jobs suitable for injured workers. WSIB spends more money 
fighting claims than it does to help injured workers. I believe the money should be 
paid to injured workers, not lawyers and greedy WSIB employees. 
(male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Increased workload. Lack of respect for collective agreement from management. 
Lack of job security. Workplace injuries.  Incompetent supervisors.  
(male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Ignoring seniority when convenient, union and company both.  Special deals lacl 
of clarity in working allows for big discrepancies when dealing with moving 
workers around and changing work procedures. (female/fulltime/paint) 
- The company cares more for numbers than the workers. (male/full/paint) 
- As we all get older, we are working harder, heavier jobs, 6 days a week with no 
downtime for our bodies to heal and recover from the workweek. We’re going to 
see a steady increase in older injured workers here as they steadily decrease time 
to complete jobs and increase the workload and weight.  (male/fulltime/welding) 
- The CAW allowing EMD workers to bump SWE workers and the fact that the 
CAW National was behind this.  (male/fulltime/welding) 
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- Safety, job security, job overload.  (male/fulltime/welding) 
- No equal pay for equal work. Waste, downtime. People still not being treated 
equally, management having their favourites. (male/SWE/welding) 
- The SWEs should be full time with the same grow-in period as the first people 
hired. GM makes billions in profit and screws the workers with their global 
economy B.S. (male/fulltime/welding) 
- Quality through attitude. Bad approaches from SWEs and preferential hires will 
cause issues that the full-timers put behind them years ago. 
(male/fulltime/welding) 
- Job overload, can’t trust management, no open communication, managers seem to 
be above all. (male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Job security, pension, benefits, wages that match rising costs. 
(male/fulltime/welding) 
- Closure,  SWEs rights, pension, mandatory vacations. (male/fulltime/paint) 
- SWEs should be unionized workers, even if its at a lower rate of pay.  Most don’t 
trust the union over past deals with GM.  Uncertainty, nobody feels that their jobs 
are truly safe going into contracts next year and keeping our jobs in Canada. 
(female/fulltime/welding) 
- Workloads and management attitude. Not enough workers. 
(male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Vacation, pension, staffing, job loads. (male/fulltime/materials) 
- Being given time allowed to build quality vehicles. (female/fulltime/assembly) 
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- 2 tier wages are a poison that should be banned by government. Equal pay for 
equal work. (male/fulltime/stamping) 
- Full time verses SWEs. Lack of communication between company and worker 
and union. Micro managing and job security.  (female/fulltime/stamping) 
- Erosion of quality of life. Income and security along with  6 day weeks. Income 
going down. Perpetual threat of closure. (male/fulltime/stamping) 
- Staffing, pensions, security, plant closure language. (male/fulltime/materials) 
- More vacation, job security, less discipline.  (male/fulltime/welding) 
- Job security. Don’t know when GM will go into crisis again.  
(male/fulltime/materials) 
- Getting my 30 years and getting out.  (male/fulltime/assembly) 
- The race to the bottom for wages and benefits.  (male/fulltime/quality) 
- Threat of discipline and job security. (male/fulltime/welding) 
- They are not telling the truth. Management lie and cheat and do what ever to get 
the job done.(male/fulltime/welding) 
- Overworked physically and mentally. (male/fulltime) 
- The continual reduction of jobs. Especially a concern given the average age of the 
workers.  (male/fulltime/paint) 
- Job security, safety, and retirement.  We need more recovery time. We work 6 
days a week and lost 2 weeks of holidays. (male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Job security, time studies and declining benefits.  (male/fulltime/assembly) 
- EMD workers bumping SWEs and the contract.  (female/SWE/assembly) 
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- Security with job. Being able to retire with good health. Jobs for future workers. 
(female/fulltime/paint) 
- I understand the concept behind SWEs in the workforce but it can create a two-
tiered system that isn’t really fair to the SWEs.  (male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Job security and the future of me as a SWE.  Our union must fight for SWEs 
rights to maintain and preserve the right to equality. In some occasions we are 
treated as third class workers. And that is a union failure. (male/SWE/assembly) 
- Equal pay for equal work. Management focus on improving working conditions 
and not disciplines and favouritism. Aging workforce and 3 years of 6 days a 
week with 98% attendance with little to no recognition or appreciation from 
management.  There’s a need for more honesty.  (male/fulltime/assembly) 
- SWEs should be fulltime with benefits.  (female/fulltime/paint) 
- The workers do not stick together and it will worsen with tier wages.  Our union 
leadership is lacking in portraying togetherness and standing up for our rights. 
(female/fulltime/paint) 
- No respect. 6 day mandatory work week. (male/fulltime/welding) 
- Future product as we are in a global economy. (male/fulltime/paint) 
- Job security, not only for myself but the junior workers in the plant (SWEs). 
(male/fulltime/paint) 
- Work too much overtime. (male/fulltime/paint) 
- Outsourcing vehicles to other plants. (female/fulltime/paint) 
- Not enough time off. (male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Standards, quality and safety.  (male/fulltime/quality) 
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- Treatment of SWEs, same work for less pay.  No limit on the ratio of SWEs to 
full time workers.  (male/fulltime/assembly) 
- As time goes on, we work harder and get less reward for doing so. Lost vacation, 
no cost of living raises in 4 years management bonuses never missed a beat. 
TAKE<TAKE<TAKE. (female/fulltime/assembly) 
- Distrust between labour, union and management. (male/SWE/assembly) 
- Divide between full time and SWE.  Management games and bootlickers getting 
special treatment from management.  (female/fulltime/assembly) 
- Lack of solidarity due to increase in unwelcome intimidation from company to 
SWE workforce.  (male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Workers pitted against each other. No equal pay for equal work. Line speeds 
constantly increased. Not a lot of concern for balancing the workload. Jobs being 
sourced out that CAMI workers used to do. (female/fulltime/quality) 
- The SWEs should have a chance for fulltime employment after a certain period of 
time. I don’t like how lean we run, team leaders on line kills quality and morale.  
(male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Pensions, base pay and holidays. (male/fulltime/paint) 
- Not enough TPT’s in paint.(male/fulltime/paint) 
- Future work.  SWE workers should only have to put in a certain amount of time 
before gaining better benefits and security in their jobs.  (female/fulltime/paint) 
- After watching caterpillar shutdown GE in London you have to question how 
secure any job is.  The pace of work and how workers can continue at this pace 
without serious repercussions to their health and home life. (female/fulltime/paint) 
 114 
- Everyone be treated equal, no favourites.  Losing our pensions and the well being 
of the worker. (female/fulltime/paint) 
- Job security. Protection for all employees full and SWEs.  
(female/fulltime/quality) 
- Hard nose management types. Very few are decent. The decent management 
people get more cooperation.  (female/fulltime/quality) 
- The erosion of good paying manufacturing jobs. (male/fulltime) 
- No time off for people. Everybody is burned out. No trust in management. GM 
treats everyone like a number, not a person.  (female/SWE/assembly) 
- Wage and benefit gap between fulltime and SWEs. (male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Future product.  (male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Job security and working too many hours. SWEs should be hired 
fulltime.(male/fulltime/quality) 
- SWEs should be full time and have the right to post. (male/fulltime/assembly) 
 
Question 22.  Do you have any suggestions for improving worker rights? 
- Hire SWEs full time!(male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Management needs to be more receptive to workers issues and needs 
(male/fulltime/welding) 
- Try to get all workers to be equal..no two tier system (male/fulltime/welding) 
- Need to change public perception.  Unions have been demonized by the media. 
We are perceived as lazy, greedy and uneducated by the public.  It’s impossible to 
make any gains at this time. (male/fulltime/stamping) 
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- Need a stronger union!! (male/fulltime/materials) 
- Healthy economy. (male/fulltime/welding) 
- Make sure SWEs are full time, give SWEs the same rights as full timers 
(female/SWE/welding) 
- Get rid of the useless people in this plant that take full advantage of light 
duty/disability and still refuse when under normal working conditions to complete 
a task at hand.  Start protecting the people, yes even SWEs cus(sic) we are people 
that actually deserve a job here! (male/SWE/assembly) 
- Better contractual language, more participation from unionized workers, more 
education to take us from always criticizing each other to supporting each 
other…ie..teachers to autoworkers to city workers to fire fighters to 
police.(male/fulltime/paint) 
- Unions should go on a media blitz to educate the public about lies told to them by 
big 3 automakers and how it not only effects us but also them.  The gained public 
support would give us more power to negotiate in improving our rights. 
(male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Line side issues (defects should be followed up with intent to improve or fix 
problems, not discipline.  SWEs should be replacing retirees or quits.  SWE 
become P.A’s, it will improve morale and the future of the 
company.(male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Maintain a strong union voice, and push for the rights of all workers, fulltime and 
SWEs. More newsletters and information from union, what are issues and 
concerns in all areas of the plant and membership. (male/fulltime/quality) 
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- Make SWEs equal. (female/SWE/assembly) 
- Reintroduce anti-scab legislation. (male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Have management stop being adversarial. We want the same thing, to build 
quality cars that sell, why not work with us instead of against us? 
(male/fulltime/assembly) 
- All workers should be equal. (female/SWE/assembly) 
- Maybe deal with language issues in the next contract (male/fulltime/materials) 
- Stronger union heads like when the union started. (female/fulltime/assembly) 
- Legislation for temp workers, no two-tier hiring would be ideal, as the company 
profits skyrockets, we should see some benefit..It’s the workers that produce the 
profit. (female/fulltime/assembly) 
- There should be a limit on the amount of money a CEO can make which the 
government should set. (male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Solidarity within our local and with other unions and organizations. 
(male/fulltime/assembly) 
- We have to first deal with what is going on in China.  We all lose jobs to China if 
their rights are not improved. (male/fulltime/assembly) 
- We need to voice our concerns to all levels of government with more involvement 
from our youth and younger generation.  We need to look into our national auto 
manufacturing policy by having our government get into the game! 
(male/fulltime/materials) 
- Full time workers have more rights than SWE, that is not right.  TPT have it better 
than the SWEs.  (male/fulltime/paint) 
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- Don’t create divisions…SWEs.  Stop making concession…equal pay for equal 
work!!!(male/fulltime/assembly) 
- More people, more minds, more power. (male/fulltime/welding) 
- More openness between upper management and other layers including 
workers.(male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Stronger leadership in the union.(male/fulltime/assembly) 
- Omit management rights from the collective agreement because every situation 
always refers back to rights and not ours. (female/fulltime/assembly) 
- SWEs have posting rights. (female/fulltime/assembly) 
- Equality.  (female/SWE/assembly) 
- Stop trying to get along with the company.  Go back to old style union.  Company 
is not our friend. (male/fulltime/welding) 
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Appendix D 
Brock University  
Department of Sociology/MACS 
 
Informed Consent Form 
 
Date:  XXXX/2012 
Title of Study: The Myth of Labour-Management Partnerships, Risk to Labour.  A CAMI Automotive Study. 
Principal Student Investigator: Doug Billyard, Student, dpbillyard@hotmail.com  
Department of Critical Sociology 
Brock University 
Faculty Supervisor(s): Murray Smith, Professor, Jonah Butovsky, Associate Professor, June Corman, Professor Department: Sociology 
Brock University, Phone number: 905.688.5550  
 
Name of Participant: (Please Print) ______________________________ 
 
I have been invited to participate in a study that involves research. The purpose of this study is to understand the risks associated with the labour-
management partnership at CAMI.   
To ensure the safety of participants in research, Brock University requires that all participants are informed of the nature of the research. I have 
included all the relevant information in bullet point form below.   
 
As a participant of this study, I understand; 
-     Once published, the research will clearly identify the research site as CAMI Automotive.  
-     That the union has provided permission for the researcher to contact workers. The union is not sponsoring the research, and my 
 decision to participate or not will have no bearing on my employment/union relationships. 
- That this study in which I have agreed to participate will involve participating in a focus group interview.  
- That I will be asked a number of questions of which I may decline to answer without penalty.  
- That there is no potential for physical or psychological harm involved in answering these questions. 
- That my participation is voluntary and I may withdraw from the study at any time and for any reason.   
-    That the focus group will be audio-recorded and transcribed. If I decide to withdraw my participation during the focus group interview, any 
audio-recorded comments that I have made will be difficult to remove due to the limitations of the researcher to identify and remove data based on 
voice recognition alone.    
- That there will be no payment for my participation.   
- That I’m not obliged to answer any questions that I consider invasive, offensive or inappropriate. 
-   That as a participant, I will respect the confidentiality of all other participants including opinions and submissions expressed during the focus 
group session.   
- That only the above listed researcher(s) will have access to the information.  
- That any identifying information such as my name will be eliminated from research reports so that my identity cannot be associated with my 
answers. 
-     That focus group participant information will not be provided to the union or the company.   
 
Data collected during this study will be stored by the researcher in a locked and secure filing cabinet until December/2012.  Access to the data will 
be restricted to the principal student investigator and the faculty supervisor(s).  Results of this study may be published in professional journals and 
presented at conferences. Feedback about this study will be available to the union after xxx 2012, upon request.  
If you have any questions about this study or require further information, please contact the Principal Student Investigator or the Faculty 
Supervisor(s) using the contact information provided above. This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Research 
Ethics Board at Brock University (file #11-274-SMITH). If you have any comments or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please 
contact the Research Ethics Office at (905) 688.5550 Ext. 3035, reb@brocku.ca. 
 
Thank you for your assistance in this project. Please keep a copy of this form for your records. 
 
I agree to participate in this study described above. I have made this decision based on the information I have read in the Information-Consent 
Letter. I have had the opportunity to receive any additional details I wanted about the study and understand that I may ask questions in the future. I 
understand that I may withdraw this consent at any time.   
 
 
Signature: _____________________ Date:  xxxx/2012 
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Appendix E 
Focus Group Interview Guideline    
 Doug  Billyard 
 
1) Introduction to participants. 
(Participants will receive the consent form which will be read and signed prior to the 
beginning of the meeting.) 
- background /purpose of the interview.  
- focus group protocols and meeting expectation and  time commitment will be 
communicated to the group. Remind group of their rights to withdraw and 
confidentiality.   
-  
2) Open ended Interview Guideline questions.  The interview format will be more 
conversational, allowing participants to answer in their own terms. 
 
a) Think back to when you first joined CAMI and describe what your thoughts 
and impressions of CAMI were back than compared to today?  How has the 
partnership evolved? 
 
- prompts; pay, benefits, working conditions, job enjoyment/fulfillment, job 
advancement, opportunities, workloads, personal wealth, future potential…etc 
-  
b) How would you describe your experience with the CAMI labour-management 
partnership? 
Prompts; 
 
- Job security/insecurity 
- Work intensification 
- Role of work cell teams, team leaders. 
- Reduced/increased job autonomy 
- Role of the union  (executive, shop floor stewards)    
- Role of  management 
- JPM and the partnership verses  the traditional automotive model (describe) 
- The contract (wages and benefits) 
- Workplace democracy 
- Reciprocal obligation (describe) 
- What is missing?  What would you change in the partnership to make your job 
and working conditions better? 
 
 
b) Open the floor to any comments which the participants might like to add to the 
interview.   
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Appendix F 
Compensation & Benefits Comparison
59
 
Production Associate Wages from 1998 – 2012 
 
Benefits Comparison 
A) Shift Premiums    B)  Vacation Entitlement 
1998-2001   1998-2001(initial contract) 2001-2004(increase) 
5% >11am <7pm   >
60
1yr < 3yrs 2 weeks  >1yr < 3yrs 2weeks 
10% > 7pm < 4:45am  >3yrs < 5yrs 2weeks    >3yrs < 5yrs 2weeks 
Team leaders@ $1/hour  >5yrs < 10 yrs 3weeks  >5yrs < 10yrs 3weeks 
2001-2004   >10yrs < 15 yrs 3 weeks  >10yrs < 15yrs 3weeks 
5% >11am <7pm   >15yrs <20yrs        >15yrs < 20yrs 4weeks 
10% > 7pm < 4:45am 
Team leaders@ $1/hour  2004-2007 (increase)  2007-2010 (increase)  
2004-2007   >1yr < 2yrs 2wks/3d
61
  >1yr < 2yrs  2wks/3d  
5% >11am <7pm   >2yrs < 3yrs 2wks/4d  >2yrs < 3yrs 2wks/4d  
10% > 7pm < 4:45am  >3yrs < 5yrs 3wks/2.5d >3yrs < 5yrs      3wks/2.5d 
Team leaders@ $1/hour  >5yrs < 10yrs 4 weeks  >5yrs < 10yrs 4 weeks 
2007-2010   >10yrs < 15 yrs 4 wks/2.5d >10yrs <15yrs   4wks/2.5d 
5% >11am <7pm   >15yrs < 20 yrs 5weeks  >15yrs < 20 yrs 5weeks 
10% > 7pm < 4:45am      >20years 6 weeks 
                                                 
59
 All compensation and benefits data was retrieved from hard copy collective agreements supplied by 
CAW Local 88.  
60
 >; To qualify for vacation entitlement, > is defined in the contract as greater than or equal to.   
61
 d; individual days 
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Team leaders@ $1/hour  2010-2013(decrease) 
2010-2013   >1yr < 2yrs 2wks 
5% >11am <7pm   >2yrs < 3yrs 2wks/1d 
10% > 7pm < 4:45am  no further changes 
Team leaders@ $1/hour 
 
Rest Period  
 
1998-2001 18 minutes/0.5 shift 
2001-2004 18 minutes/0.5 shift 
2004-2007 18 minutes/0.5 shift 
2007-2010 18 minutes/0.5 shift 
2010-2013 10 minutes/0.5 shift (decrease in rest time of 16 minutes/shift) 
 
 
 
Appendix G 
IPA & TUC Principles62 
Partnership Principles 
IPA (1992) TUC (1997) 
Essential 
commitments to: 
Success of the enterprise  A commitment to the success of the organization 
Building trust through greater involvement A focus on the quality of working life 
Respect for the legitimacy of other partners A recognition of and respect for the legitimate roles of 
the employer and the trade union 
Plus 
supplementary 
‘building blocks’ 
Recognition for employees’ desire for security 
and the employers’ need for maximize flexibility 
A commitment to employment security 
Sharing success within the company Openness and transparency 
Informing and consulting staff about issues at 
workplace and company level  
Adding value to all concerned  
The effective representation of people’s views 
within the organization 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62
 Table sourced from Working in Partnership, Sarah Pass (2008). 
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